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ABSTRACT
Due to the common occurrence of rear end collisions in South Australia, and the costliness of Compulsory Third
Party (CTP) claims associated with them, a study was undertaken into the nature of, and possible countermeasures
for, rear end collisions. This study included an analysis of five years of police-reported crash data, an analysis of a
sample of rear end crashes investigated as part of the CASR metropolitan in-depth crash study, and a literature
review concerned with countermeasures for rear end crashes. The most common factors contributing to these
types of crashes are the lack of protection for right turning vehicles and the inadequate allocation of attention by
drivers to the driving task. Countermeasures are available for both of these contributing factors. Providing greater
protection for right turning vehicles requires road-based countermeasures, while the most promising
countermeasure for inadequate allocation of attention is the installation in vehicles of collision avoidance systems.
However, the latter countermeasure will only be available after further testing and refinement of current prototype
systems.
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Summary
Due to the common occurrence of rear end collisions in South Australia, and the costliness
of Compulsory Third Party (CTP) claims associated with them, a study was undertaken into
the nature of, and possible countermeasures for, rear end collisions. This study included an
analysis of five years of police-reported crash data, an analysis of a sample of rear end
crashes investigated as part of the CASR metropolitan in-depth crash study, and a literature
review concerned with countermeasures for rear end crashes.
The results of the analysis of the mass data on police-reported crashes and the in-depth
crash investigation were consistent, with most rear end crashes occurring on straight, level
roads and in clear weather conditions. Both analyses also revealed that drivers of striking
vehicles were more likely to be young and male than drivers of the vehicles they struck. This
is consistent with notions that young, male drivers represent a problematic group of drivers
who are often crash-involved and also tend to be responsible for their crashes. Rear end
crashes, in this respect, are typical of crashes in general. Injuries resulting from rear end
crashes tended to be of low severity, and the in-depth study revealed that occupants of
struck vehicles were more likely to require hospital treatment than occupants of striking
vehicles.
Factors that increase the likelihood of the occurrence of rear end collisions include higher
traffic density (i.e. peak hour traffic; arterial roads), the presence of an intersection, and the
presence of a right turning vehicle. These factors are related to rear end crashes because
they increase the likelihood of conflict with slowing or stationary vehicles on the road.
There are a number of countermeasures to reduce rear end crashes involving stationary,
right turning vehicles. Where intersections feature a high frequency of rear end collisions
with right turning vehicles, possible countermeasures include: relocation of the right turn to
a different intersection, provision of a right turn only lane, increasing the storage capacity of
the right turn lane so that turning vehicles are not forced to queue in adjacent through lanes,
and increasing the duration of right turn arrows. The sample of rear end crashes investigated
in the in-depth study included cases in which a vehicle was waiting to turn right from an
arterial road without the benefit of a designated right turn only lane, and also included a case
in which the capacity of the right turn lane was insufficient to cope with the number of
vehicles waiting to turn right, resulting in a vehicle protruding into the through lane and
being struck in the rear. There were also a number of crashes in which a vehicle was struck
when waiting to turn right from a single lane road that did not allow through traffic to pass
on the left. For the latter crashes, available engineering solutions are likely to be prohibitively
expensive, unless traffic volumes satisfy the requirements for a major upgrade of the road,
as was the case for the road in one of the crashes investigated. Such crashes may need to
be addressed using countermeasures for inadequate allocation of attention (see below).
Countermeasures are also available for left turning traffic at intersections. Slip lanes that
make turning simpler can be introduced, enabling left turning traffic to turn into the adjoining
road prior to merging with traffic, or a larger angle between the left turn lane and adjoining
road can be used, enabling better visibility of traffic to aid the determination of gap
acceptance. There was one crash in the in-depth study involving a left turning vehicle being
struck from behind. The striking driver moved in response to a gap in the traffic on the
adjoining road in anticipation of the struck vehicle turning. If the left turn had been simpler,
the struck vehicle may have been able to turn at this point rather than remaining stationary,
although inadequate allocation of attention on the part of the striking driver was still the
prime determining factor of the crash.
Another factor that can increase the likelihood of rear end collisions is a parked vehicle by
the side of the road. Clearways and parking restrictions on the approach to intersections are
useful because they enhance the visibility of the intersection and other traffic, and reduce
obstacles in the vicinity of the intersection that could cause vehicles to stop. The in-depth
study included three cases in which legally parked vehicles may have contributed to the
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occurrence of a rear end collision. It is also important to note that both the Traffic Accident
Reporting Systems (TARS) analysis and the in-depth study analysis excluded cases where
the struck vehicle was parked (as such crashes are often classified as ‘hit parked vehicle’
rather than ‘rear end collision’). In the in-depth study, seven of the original sample of 47
cases classified as rear end crashes involved collisions into the rear of parked vehicles.
Relatively few rear end collisions in the in-depth study were the result of the restriction of
driver vision caused by curved roads. This is consistent with the small percentage of such
crashes that occur on curved roads in South Australia, as seen in the analysis of data on
police-reported crashes. This low frequency of rear end crashes on curved roads is likely to
be due to relative paucity of curved roads in metropolitan Adelaide. Nonetheless, the
literature suggests that where intersections are present shortly after a curve in the road, it
would be useful for drivers to be warned by appropriate signs of the possibility of queued
stationary traffic following the curve.
Also, relatively few rear end crashes in the in-depth study were associated with wet
weather, as was the case with the police-reported crashes included in the TARS analysis,
This would suggest that relatively few of the crashes would have been avoided, or their
severity reduced, by skid resistance treatment of the road surface. Skid resistance
treatments, however, may still prove cost-beneficial in South Australia if applied to roads
with high crash rates, especially if such roads have a high ratio of wet to dry weather
crashes or are characterised by a marked down slope.
Turning to driver-related factors, inadequate allocation of attention was found in the in-depth
crash study to be a frequent contributor to rear end crash causation, and may have been
underestimated in the results, given that interviews in which attentional issues were
explored were not possible with all crash participants. Inadequate allocation of attention
could be divided into four different types: cases in which drivers were not sufficiently
focused on the driving task; cases in which drivers were distracted from the driving task by
objects or events either in or outside the vehicle; cases in which the drivers were unable to
adequately divide their attention between two or more driving-related tasks; and cases in
which drivers were unable to adequately allocate their attention to appropriate aspects of
the road and traffic environment when changing lanes.
In order to combat the inadequate allocation of attention of drivers, the necessary
countermeasure would be the installation in vehicles of collision avoidance systems. Such
systems typically combine adaptive cruise control, which slows the vehicle automatically in
response to the presence of slower vehicles ahead, and devices that actively alert the driver
to the need to apply heavier braking to avoid a collision. Early studies of prototype collision
avoidance systems have revealed that they are capable of providing useful early warnings to
drivers of the need to take evasive action to avoid collisions. However, it is necessary to
examine the way drivers interact with them in real-world settings before being certain that
they can provide cost-effective reductions in levels of crash involvement. Specifically, it
needs to be assessed whether drivers begin to disregard the collision warnings after a
series of ‘nuisance’ alarms.
The literature also suggests the advantages of increasing the conspicuity of the rear of
vehicles to decrease the likelihood of rear end collisions. Few crashes in the in-depth study
were attended at night, and none of those occurring during the day was clearly related to
the low conspicuity of the rear of the struck vehicle. Although this may mean that low
conspicuity is not a common factor in rear end crashes, there are likely to be some such
crashes in which it is. The use of specially designed lights on the rear of vehicles to warn
following drivers that they are too close or closing too quickly may prove useful, by both
increasing conspicuity and combating the inattention of following drivers, although work on
these projects is in the early stages only.
Finally, a number of the rear end collisions investigated in the in-depth study were
associated with medical conditions and/or drug use on the part of the driver of the striking
vehicle. Although these crashes also involved inadequate allocation of attention to the
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driving task, it is unclear whether collision avoidance systems would have been sufficient to
prevent their occurrence. These cases highlight the importance of the application of medical
fitness to drive guidelines (Austroads, 2001) to prevent people driving when their condition
is incompatible with the safe operation of a motor vehicle.
In summary, this report has provided a detailed account of the nature of rear end collisions,
using both mass data on police-reported crashes and the information collected in in-depth
metropolitan crash investigations. The most common factors contributing to these types of
crashes are the lack of protection for right turning vehicles from following traffic and the
inadequate allocation of attention by drivers to the driving task. Countermeasures are
available for both of these contributing factors. Also, although not directly addressed in this
report, it needs to be borne in mind that countermeasures that reduce traffic congestion
would also provide major reductions in rear end collisions.
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1 Introduction
Rear end crashes are one of the most common crash types in South Australia and are
known to generate a large number of whiplash injuries and, as a consequence, costly
Compulsory Third Party (CTP) claims. For these reasons, there is value in understanding
more about the characteristics of rear end crashes in South Australia. To this end, CASR
have extracted data from the Traffic Accident Reporting System (TARS), consisting of police
reports on crashes, and data files compiled from our in-depth investigation of metropolitan
road crashes in Adelaide. TARS and in-depth crash investigation data provide
complementary information regarding the nature of rear end crashes and are analysed in
Sections 2 and 3, respectively.
In addition, literature pertaining to rear end crashes has been reviewed, in order to identify
means by which the frequency of rear end crashes can be reduced. Road-based and vehicle-
based countermeasures for rear end crashes are discussed in Section 4.
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2 TARS analysis
This section analyses South Australian police-reported rear end crash data in an attempt to
characterise this type of crash. Five years of data were used and analyses focused on the
circumstances of the crash and characteristics of the drivers involved.
2.1 Data source
The Traffic Accident Reporting System (TARS) database is maintained by the South
Australian Department for Transport, Energy and Infrastructure (DTEI) and is based on
crashes reported to the police. It represents the best available data on the occurrence of
road crashes in South Australia, having, at the time of writing, complete data for crashes
from 1981 to June 2004.
For the current analysis, casualty crashes for the years 1998 to 2002 inclusive, as recorded
in TARS, were analysed as a group. These years were chosen because the property damage
limit for property damage only crashes was raised in 2003 to $3,000 (from $1,000 as
specified for the years 1998-2002). Note that the TARS data as supplied to the Centre in
July 2005 were used. TARS is being constantly updated so re-running the analyses
presented here on a different version of the TARS data may produce slightly different
results. The total number of crashes for these five years was 203,140. Of these, 67,693
(33%) were classified as rear end crashes.
The first part of the analysis (Section 2.2.1) is concerned with all crash types, comparing
those, which were classified as rear end crashes with all other crashes. This section
excludes cases featuring a number of ‘unit’ types (pedal cycle, railway vehicle, tram, small
wheel vehicle, tree, traffic signal pole, bridge, guard rail, sign post, Stobie pole, other pole,
pedestrian in car park, pedestrian on road, ridden animal, animal drawn vehicle, domestic
animal - not ridden, wild animal, other fixed obstruction, other). Furthermore, crashes
classified as ‘rear end collisions’ but which featured less than two motor vehicles were also
excluded. Of the original 67,693 crashes, 422 were thus excluded (216 featuring excluded
unit types and 206 featuring less than two vehicles). Finally, crashes were also excluded if
they involved parked vehicles, vehicles exiting a parking space, or vehicles that were
reversing. This gave a total number of rear end crashes in the analysis of 61,024, and a
comparison group of 142,116 ‘other’ crashes.
The second section (Section 2.2.2) provides an analysis of the rear end crash sample only
and involves a comparison of the vehicles and drivers responsible for the crash with those
not responsible. Efforts were made to only include cases in this sample for which the
responsible vehicle was the ‘striking’ (i.e. rear) vehicle, in order to be able to compare the
striking vehicle with the ‘struck’ (i.e. front) vehicle. The method for excluding other cases is
provided prior to the results of this analysis in Section 2.2.2.
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Comparing rear end crashes with other crashes
This section provides a comparison of the rear end crashes with other types of crashes,
with regard to a number of variables. These crash-related variables are: geographical area,
hour of the day, day of the week, road geometry, wetness of the road, presence of rain,
lighting conditions, crash injury severity, traffic control, road vertical alignment, and road
horizontal alignment. The relationships between these variables and rear end crashes were
explored to determine if there were any common characteristics of the sample of rear end
crashes that differentiated them from other crash types.
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GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
The geographical areas defined in the TARS database are City (inner Adelaide), Metropolitan
(rest of Adelaide) and Country (outside Adelaide). The number of rear end and other crashes
occurring in these areas are shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1
Crash type by geographical area
Geographical area Rear end crashes Other crashes Rear end (%) Other (%)
Metropolitan 51,085  100,112  83.7  70.4
City 6,412 11,427  10.5  8.1
Country 3,527 30,577  5.8  21.5
Total 61,024 142,116 100.0 100.0
Just over 10 percent of the rear end crashes occurred in the city, 84 percent in the
metropolitan area and only six percent in the country. Other crash types were similarly most
likely to occur in the metropolitan area but, unlike rear end crashes, other crash types were
more likely to occur in country areas than in inner Adelaide. Expressed another way, rear
end crashes comprised 36 percent of all city crashes and 34 percent of all metropolitan area
crashes but only 10 percent of country crashes. The proportions of all crashes that occurred
in the city, metropolitan area and the country were nine percent, 74 percent and 17 percent,
respectively.
HOUR OF CRASH
Figure 2.1 allows for a comparison of rear end crashes with other crashes, with reference to
when they occurred during the day. It can be seen in Figure 2.1 that rear end crash
frequencies followed the pattern of all crashes, except for higher peaks from 8am to 9am
and from 3pm to 6pm, and fewer occurring between 7pm and 7am. The peaks therefore












































































Hour of crash for rear end and all other crashes
DAY OF WEEK
Table 2.2 provides details of the day of week on which different crash types occurred. It can
be seen that the frequency of rear end crashes was greater during the weekdays, rising
steadily from 14 percent of rear end crashes occurring on Mondays to a peak of 18 percent
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on Fridays. Compared with other crash types, rear end crashes appear to have been under-
represented on weekends.
Table 2.2
Crash type by day of week
Day of week Rear end crashes Other crashes Rear end (%) Other (%)
Monday 8,616 18,778 14.1 13.2
Tuesday 9,365 19,375 15.3 13.6
Wednesday 9,921 20,847 16.3 14.7
Thursday 10,760 22,672 17.6 16.0
Friday 11,051 24,451 18.1 17.2
Saturday 6,884 20,706 11.3 14.6
Sunday 4,427 15,287 7.3 10.8
Total 61,024 142,116 100.0 100.0
ROAD LAYOUT
Table 2.3 shows the number of crashes of different types occurring at sites characterised by
different types of road layout. Road layouts classified in the ‘Other’ category include Y-
junctions, pedestrian crossings, freeways, rail crossings, interchanges, on and off ramps,
cross overs and one-way roads.
Rear end crashes appear to have been over-represented at, or near, cross roads, and on
divided roads. They were correspondingly under-represented on undivided roads.
Table 2.3
Crash type by road layout
Road layout Rear end crashes Other crashes Rear end (%) Other (%)
Cross road 19,761 25,806  32.4  18.2
Divided road 18,489  22,129  30.3  15.6
T-junction 14,829  28,975  24.3  20.4
Undivided road  4,769  42,398  7.8  29.8
Multiple  1,301  1,817  2.1  1.3
Other  1,875  20,991  3.1  14.8
Total 61,024 142,116 100.0 100.0
ROAD WETNESS
Table 2.4 shows the number of crashes of different types that occurred on wet or dry roads.
It appears from the Table that road wetness did not greatly affect the relative frequency of
rear end crashes compared with other crash types.
Table 2.4
Crash type by road wetness
Road wetness Rear end crashes Other crashes Rear end (%) Other (%)
Dry 52,859 124,088  86.6  87.3
Wet  8,165  18,028  13.4  12.7
Total 61,024 142,116 100.0 100.0
PRESENCE OF RAIN
Table 2.5 shows the number of crashes of different types that occurred when it was raining
and when it was not. Reflecting the findings for road wetness, the Table below shows that
the presence of rain had no significant effect on rear end crash numbers relative to other
crash types. There was one crash for which weather conditions were unknown.
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Table 2.5
Crash type by presence of rain
Presence of rain Rear end crashes Other crashes Rear end (%) Other (%)
Not raining 55,720 129,957  91.3  91.4
Raining  5,304  12,158  8.7  8.6
Total 61,024  142,115* 100.0 100.0
* For one ‘other’ crash, the presence or not of rain was unknown
LIGHTING CONDITIONS
The proportion of crashes of different types that occurred in the three categories of lighting
conditions (daylight, night, dawn/dusk) is shown in Table 2.6. It can be seen that rear end
crashes were over-represented during daylight hours and under-represented at night.
Table 2.6
Crash type by lighting conditions
Lighting conditions Rear end crashes Other crashes Rear end (%) Other (%)
Daylight 52,647 105,632  86.3  74.3
Night  6,889  32,648  11.3  22.9
Dawn or dusk  1,488  3,835  2.4  2.7
Total 61,024  142,115* 100.0 100.0
* For one ‘other’ crash, the lighting conditions were unknown
CRASH INJURY SEVERITY
Crash injury severity is measured by the highest level of injury sustained by any of the crash
participants. Table 2.7 shows that rear end crashes tended to result in low injury severity,
with an under-representation of crashes requiring hospital treatment or admission of crash
participants, and an under-representation of fatal crashes. Also of note was that the
percentages of property damage only crashes were about the same for the two groups of
crashes.
Table 2.7
Crash type by crash injury severity
Crash injury severity Rear end crashes Other crashes Rear end (%) Other (%)
Property damage only 50,317 115,352  82.5  81.2
Treated by doctor  7,011  6,378  11.5  4.5
Treated by hospital  3,228  13,977  5.3 9.8
Admitted to hospital  454  5,714  0.7  4.0
Fatal  14  695  0.0  0.5
Total 61,024 142,116 100.0 100.0
TRAFFIC CONTROL
Table 2.8 shows the traffic controls present at the site for the two sets of crashes. The main
differences between rear end crashes and other crash types was the under-representation
of rear end crashes in situations without any traffic control devices, and the over-
representation of rear end crashes at sites controlled by traffic signals.
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Table 2.8
Crash type by traffic control
Type of traffic control Rear end crashes Other crashes Rear end (%) Other (%)
No control 34,050 109,955  55.8  77.4
Traffic signals 22,209  18,003  36.4  12.7
Roundabout  1,677  3,728  2.7  2.7
Stop sign  1,609  4,742  2.6  3.3
Give Way sign  1,257  5,496  2.1  3.9
Rail crossing  156  133  0.3  0.1
Other  66  59  0.1  0.0
Total 61,024 142,116 100.0 100.0
ROAD VERTICAL ALIGNMENT
Table 2.9 shows the vertical alignment of the roads at which the two sets of crashes
occurred. It can be seen that rear end crashes were slightly over-represented on level roads
and under-represented on slopes, crests and at the bottom of hills.
Table 2.9
Crash type by road vertical alignment
Vertical alignment Rear end crashes Other crashes Rear end (%) Other (%)
Level 56,457 124,561 92.5 87.6
Slope 3,384 12,608 5.6 8.9
Crest of hill 686 2,787 1.1 2.0
Bottom of hill 429 1,666 0.7 1.2
Unknown 68 494 0.1 0.3
Total 61,024 142,116 100.0 100.0
ROAD HORIZONTAL ALIGNMENT
Table 2.10 shows the horizontal alignment of the roads at which the two sets of crashes
occurred. Rear end crashes were over-represented on straight roads, and correspondingly
under-represented on curved roads.
Table 2.10
Crash type by road horizontal alignment
Horizontal alignment Rear end crashes Other crashes Rear end (%) Other (%)
Straight road 58,688 126,872  96.2  89.3
Curved - view open  1,828  9,134  3.0  6.4
Curved - view obscured 487  5,758  0.8  4.1
Unknown  21  352  0.0  0.2
Total 61,024 142,116 100.0 100.0
2.2.2 Rear end crash-involved drivers by crash responsibility
This section focuses only on the sample of rear end crashes, with comparisons made
between the striking vehicles and the struck vehicles in cases for which the driver of the
striking vehicle was responsible for the crash. The variables included in the analysis consist
of vehicle type, driver sex, driver age and licence status. To limit the rear end sample to
appropriate rear end cases in which the vehicle driven by the responsible driver was also the
striking vehicle, a number of cases had to be excluded.
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Table 2.11
Vehicle type by driver responsibility in rear end crashes
Error type Rear end Other Rear end (%) Other (%)
Inattention 45,011 41,125 73.8 28.9
Follow too closely 14,343 293 23.5 0.2
Change lanes to endanger 756 7,131 1.2 5.0
Overtake without due care 210 3,333 0.3 2.3
Excessive speed 118 1,248 0.2 0.9
DUI 117 1,720 0.2 1.2
Died sick or asleep at wheel 79 1,006 0.1 0.7
Brake failure 69 120 0.1 0.1
Misjudgement 51 3,479 0.1 2.4
Vehicle fault 33 2,112 0.1 1.5
Dangerous driving 16 166 0.0 0.1
Fail to give way 6 25,418 0.0 17.9
Insecure load 4 437 0.0 0.3
Broken windscreen 2 1 0.0 0.0
Disobey - traffic lights 1 3,344 0.0 2.4
Fail to keep left 1 3,710 0.0 2.6
Incorrect turn 1 1,210 0.0 0.9
Disobey - Give Way sign 0 3,389 0.0 2.4
Disobey - police signal 0 3 0.0 0.0
Disobey - railway signal 0 8 0.0 0.0
Disobey - Stop sign 0 2,559 0.0 1.8
Drunken pedestrian 0 194 0.0 0.1
Fail to give way right 0 944 0.0 0.7
Fail to stand 0 9,847 0.0 6.9
Incorrect or no signal 0 145 0.0 0.1
Opening or closing door 0 1,004 0.0 0.7
Reverse without due care* 0 22,027 0.0 15.5
NA 153 5,400 0.3 3.8
Other 48 722 0.1 0.5
None 5 21 0.0 0.0
Total 61,024 142,116 100.0 100.0
* Reverse without due care crashes all classified for analysis as ‘Other’ type of crash
The total rear end sample that was used in the previous section included 73.8 percent of
cases in which the police-designated error was ‘inattention' and 23.5 percent of cases in
which the error was ‘follow too closely’ (see Table 2.11). ‘Change lanes to endanger’ (1.2%)
was the next highest category of error. All other errors accounted for less than 1.5 percent
of cases. Within the ‘change lanes to endanger’ error group, the vehicle movements were
investigated to determine whether the responsible vehicle was the striking or struck vehicle.
For all except one of the cases in which the responsible vehicle error was ‘change lanes to
endanger’, the vehicle’s movement was ‘swerving’. For cases in which the non-responsible
vehicle movement was ‘stopped on carriageway’, it was assumed that the responsible
vehicle was striking. This was checked for approximately 10 percent of these cases and all
of the randomly selected cases confirmed this assumption. For the non-responsible vehicle
movement of ‘straight ahead’, half of the checked cases involved the responsible vehicle
striking and half being struck but this portion only accounted for 0.75 percent of the total
sample and so has not been excluded from the set. For cases in which the non-responsible
vehicle movement was also ‘swerving’, the responsible vehicles were both striking and
struck, but again this group was insignificant within the responsible vehicle sample (0.01%)
and so these cases were not excluded. For all other cases of ‘change lanes to endanger’, it
was checked that the responsible vehicle was the striking vehicle.
Another error and non-responsible vehicle movement combination for which the responsible
vehicle was not always the striking vehicle was the combination of ‘fail to give way’ as the
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error and ‘straight ahead’ as the non-responsible vehicle movement. Although the
responsible vehicle in these cases was not always the striking vehicle, these cases were
left in the sample, as they comprised less than 0.01 percent of the responsible vehicles.
The cases for which the responsible vehicle error was ‘insecure load’ involved objects falling
from the back of a truck or utility (a bail of hay, a 20 litre metal drum, and a car). In each
case, the vehicles following the truck or utility stopped to avoid the item on the road and
were struck by vehicles travelling behind them, the drivers of which were unaware of the
obstruction. These cases have been excluded.
Finally, to ensure that the striking and struck vehicles could be successfully identified, cases
in this section were restricted to those involving only two appropriate units (see Section 2.1
for a list of inappropriate units). In cases in which there were more than two appropriate
units, it could not be assumed that the first two units listed in the dataset included the
striking vehicle and the vehicle it struck.
The exclusion of the cases as described here resulted in a data set of 57,152 cases. For
each of these cases, there was one striking and one struck vehicle. Characteristics of these
vehicles and their drivers are compared in this section.
VEHICLE TYPE
Table 2.12 shows the number of different vehicle types involved in rear end crashes,
according to whether they were the striking or struck vehicle in the crash. Although there is
some evidence of an over-representation of trucks and semi-trailers among the striking
vehicles group, the numbers are relatively small.
Table 2.12
Vehicle type by driver responsibility in rear end crashes
Vehicle type Striking Struck Striking (%) Struck (%)
Car 38,635 41,630 67.6 72.8
Station wagon 7,654 7,109 13.4 12.4
Utility 2,704 2,256 4.7 3.9
Panel van 2,066 1,476 3.6 2.6
Truck 1,026 660 1.8 1.2
Taxi cab 615 660 1.1 1.2
Semi trailer 423 154 0.7 0.3
Motorcycle 314 179 0.5 0.3
Omnibus 195 208 0.3 0.4
Passenger van 21 16 0.0 0.0
Other vehicle 154 99 0.3 0.2
Unknown vehicle 3,345 2,705 5.9 4.7
Total 57,152 57,152 100.0 100.0
DRIVER SEX
Male drivers accounted for 60 percent of the drivers of striking vehicles and 54 percent of
the drivers of struck vehicles (see Table 2.13). This shows that males were over-
represented in rear end crashes, relative to females, and also shows a trend for males to be
more likely to be responsible for their crashes.
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Table 2.13
Driver sex by driver responsibility in rear end crashes
Driver sex Striking Struck Striking (%) Struck (%)
Male 34,501 30,912 60.4 54.1
Female 20,199 24,650 35.3 43.1
Unknown or other 2,452 1,590 4.3 2.8
Total 57,152 57,152 100.0 100.0
DRIVER AGE
Figure 2.2 shows the percentage of drivers in different age groups who were in the striking
or struck vehicles in the crash. Young drivers were the most likely to be in the striking
vehicles in rear end crashes. The 20 to 24 age group was responsible for the highest
percentage of crashes, followed by those aged under 20. Within the under 20 age group,
there were 12 drivers under the age of 16 (the minimum age at which to obtain a learner’s
permit), seven of whom were recorded as being in the striking vehicle in the crash. Middle-
aged drivers (aged 35-59) were the least likely to be in the striking vehicle in the rear end








































Driver responsibility by age for rear end crashes
LICENCE STATUS
Table 2.14 shows the licence status of the drivers involved in rear end crashes, by crash
responsibility. It can be seen that drivers with a full licence were under-represented among
those who were the striking driver in their crashes, while provisional licence holders were
over-represented in the striking driver group.
Table 2.14
Driver licence type by driver responsibility in rear end crashes
Driver licence status Striking Struck Striking (%) Struck (%)
Full 37,463 45,382 65.5 79.4
Provisional 5,475 3,359 9.6 5.9
Learners 213 199 0.4 0.3
Unlicensed 67 35 0.1 0.1
Unknown/NA 13,934 8,177 24.4 14.3
Total 57,152 57,152 100.0 100.0
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2.3 Summary
The analysis of five years of police-reported crash data has shown a number of differences
between rear end crashes and other crash types. Rear end crashes are less likely to occur in
country areas, at night, on weekends, and on undivided roads. They are also less likely to
result in serious or fatal injuries. Rear end crashes are more likely to occur at or near cross
roads, during peak traffic times, in daylight, on level roads rather than on slopes or at the
bottom of hills, and on straight roads rather than curved roads.
A number of the characteristics associated with the occurrence of rear end crashes reflect
greater traffic density. Specifically, this explanation can account for the relatively lower
number of rear end crashes in country areas, at night, on weekends, and on undivided
roads, and for the relatively higher frequency of rear end crashes during peak traffic times
and daylight hours.
The greater frequency of rear end crashes at or near intersections is likely to be due to the
types of traffic conflicts present at intersections. Approaching an intersection, one is more
likely to encounter stationary or slowing traffic than when travelling on a midblock section of
road. This over-representation of rear end crashes at intersections is likely to be the reason
for the over-representation of rear end crashes at traffic signals, although the higher traffic
density on roads featuring traffic signals would also be a contributing factor.
It is interesting to note that rear end crashes are under-represented on curved roads
(including curved roads causing a restriction of vision), on sloping roads and at the bottom of
hills. This could be due to road engineering practices that aim not to place intersections at
such sites. It could also be due to drivers being more attentive as they steer through a
curved section of road. It is also interesting to note that wet roads and rain do not increase
the likelihood of rear end crashes relative to other crash types.
The analysis of TARS data also revealed that inattention is the error most commonly
attributed by police to drivers responsible for rear end crashes, with following too closely
the next most common. Excessive speed is rarely identified as a cause of rear end crashes
(0.2%). However, this figure is likely to underestimate the occurrence of crashes involving
excessive speed. This underestimation of the role of speed in crashes, which occurs for all
crash types, is due to the difficulty inherent in reconstructing crash events to obtain a legally
sustainable estimate of travelling speed before the crash.
A final point to emerge from the comparison of rear end crashes with other crash types is
that the former are under-represented with regard to serious or fatal injuries. Rear end
crashes are more likely than other crash types to only result in injuries that can be treated
adequately by a private doctor.
With regard to comparisons between vehicles that were striking and those that were struck
in rear end crashes, the main differences appear to be that striking vehicles are more likely
to be driven by males, young drivers and drivers on provisional licences. This is consistent
with notions that young, male drivers represent a problematic group of drivers who are
often crash-involved and also tend to be responsible for their crashes (Williams &
Shabanova, 2003).
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3 In-depth crash analysis
3.1 Introduction
Another means of examining rear end crashes is to use information collected through in-
depth crash investigations. Beginning in April 2002, CASR has been conducting an in-depth
investigation of metropolitan road crashes from which an ambulance has transported at
least one person. To the end of February 2005, 286 crashes have been investigated, 47 of
which (16.4%) were rear end collisions. That this is an under-representation of rear end
crashes relative to police-reported crashes discussed in the previous section is likely to be
due to the requirement of ambulance transport for the in-depth study and the low levels of
injury severity usually associated with rear end crashes.
For the analysis that follows, nine of the 47 crashes were excluded. Seven were excluded
because the struck vehicle was parked, and two were excluded because the striking vehicle
was a pedal cycle. Information about the remaining 38 rear end crashes is presented in this
section of the report, with the factors contributing to the causation of these crashes being
discussed in detail. The ability to provide such detailed accounts of crash causation, not
possible when using mass crash data such as that contained in TARS, is one of the main
strengths of the in-depth crash methodology.
3.2 Method
Road crashes eligible for inclusion in the metropolitan in-depth study were those occurring
on public roads in the metropolitan area to which an ambulance was called and for which at
least one person was transported to hospital. Notification of crashes was obtained by
monitoring ambulance radio frequencies and also occurred through pager notification by the
South Australian Ambulance Service.
CASR staff members were available on call to attend crash scenes during the day five days
per week and some evenings until midnight. These additional times were selected as on-call
periods following an examination of the time of day distribution of calls for an ambulance to
attend road crashes in the study area during the previous year.
The on-call team attempted to reach the scene of the crash before the vehicles involved
were moved. As we never requested, or desired, permission to exceed posted speed limits
when travelling to a crash scene, it was not possible to achieve this aim in some cases.
Occasionally, further investigation of a crash was abandoned if there was not sufficient
evidence available at the scene.
The information collected on each case included:
• photographs of the crash scene and vehicles involved
• audio-visual record of the crash scene in selected cases
• details of the road environment, including traffic control measures
• a site plan of the crash scene and vehicle movements in the crash
• details and measurements of the vehicles involved
• interviews with crash participants, witnesses and police
• information on the official police vehicle crash report, and
• injury data for crash participants who attended major metropolitan hospitals
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3.3 Results: General
This section provides details of the nature of the sample of rear end crashes investigated as
part of the metropolitan in-depth crash study. Variables examined include day of week, time
of day, speed limit zones, government authority responsible for the road, presence of
median on the road, number of road lanes, weather conditions, crash injury severity, injury
severity by seating position, vehicle type, vehicle age, movement of struck vehicles, driver
age, driver sex, licence status of drivers, seatbelt use, familiarity with the road, previous
involvement of drivers in crashes, and previous involvement in rear end crashes. Following
this background information on the crashes investigated, Section 3.4 provides an
examination of the factors contributing to the causation of the crashes.
3.3.1 Day of week
Table 3.1 shows the day of week distribution of rear end crashes investigated during the
study. The crashes investigated were not representative of day of week of rear end crashes
in general, with weekend days unrepresented, as a consequence of the distribution of on-
call times.
Table 3.1
Rear end crashes investigated by day of week
Day of week Number Percent
Monday 10 26.4
Tuesday 8 21.0
Wednesday  8  21.0
Thursday  5  13.2
Friday  7  18.4
Saturday  0  0.0
Sunday  0  0.0
Total 38 100.0
3.3.2 Time of day
Table 3.2 shows the time of day distribution of the rear end crashes investigated in the
study. Due, again, to the distribution of on-call times by time of day, an under representation
of crashes between 6pm and 6am is apparent in the study sample.
Table 3.2
Rear end crashes investigated by time of day







In most of these rear end collisions (82%), the speed limit at the site was 60 km/h. There
were two collisions at sites where the speed limit was 50 km/h and four where the speed
limit was 70 km/h or more. One rear end collision occurred at a site where road works were
in progress, with a speed limit of 25 km/h (Table 3.3).
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Table 3.3
Rear end crashes investigated by speed limit zone







Most of the rear-end crashes in this study (87%) occurred on main roads under the control
of the Department for Transport, Energy and Infrastructure (DTEI). The remaining crashes
were divided between roads under the control of the Adelaide City Council or other Local
Government Authorities (Table 3.4).
Table 3.4
Rear end crashes investigated by government
authority responsible for the road
Authority for the road Number Percent
DTEI 33 86.9
Adelaide City Council 2 5.3
Other Local Govt. Authority 3 7.9
Total 38 100.0
Approximately three quarters (73.7%) of these rear end crashes occurred on roads having a
raised median. The majority of crashes (79%) also occurred on roads with two or more lanes
of traffic in each direction of travel (Table 3.5). All of the multi-lane roads were the
responsibility of DTEI.
Table 3.5
Rear end crashes investigated by number of traffic lanes
Number of lanes Number Percent
One lane each direction 8 21.1
Two lanes each direction 19 50.0
Three lanes each direction 8 21.1
Four lanes each direction 3 7.9
Total 38 100.0
More than 80 percent of the rear end crashes occurred on roads where the vertical
alignment was level (see Table 3.6). With regard to horizontal alignment, close to 90 percent
of the crashes occurred on straight roads (see Table 3.7).
Table 3.6
Rear end crashes investigated by vertical alignment
Vertical alignment Number Percent
Level 31 81.5
Slope up 3 7.9
Slope down 2 5.3
Crest 2 5.3
Total 38 100.0
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Table 3.7
Rear end crashes investigated by horizontal alignment
Horizontal alignment Number Percent
Straight 34 89.5
Left bend 3 7.9
Right bend 1 2.6
Total 38 100.0
3.3.4 Weather and lighting characteristics
Due to the on-call times for crash investigation, the majority (95%) of rear end crashes
investigated occurred during daylight hours. Two crashes were investigated at night. In both
of these crashes, the carriageway was illuminated by street lights. Table 3.8 shows the
prevailing weather conditions noted by at-scene crash investigators. Rain was not a
common feature of the rear end crashes investigated.
Table 3.8
Rear end crashes investigated by weather conditions






3.3.5 Crash injury severity
There were 102 crash participants involved in the 38 rear end crashes investigated. The
crash participants consisted of 74 drivers (36 striking, 38 struck), two motorcycle riders
(both striking) and 26 vehicle passengers (12 striking, 14 struck). The maximum level of
injury severity for crash participants resulting from rear end collisions, in terms of treatment
required, was most commonly hospital treatment, with a total of 45 percent of vehicle
drivers, riders or passengers being transported by ambulance to hospital. The average
length of time in hospital for treatment was 3.4 hours, ranging between a minimum of less
than one hour to a maximum of five hours. Only one vehicle occupant required hospital
admission as a result of involvement in a rear end collision. In this case, the centre rear seat
passenger of a striking vehicle was admitted and hospitalised for 15 days. This vehicle
occupant’s hospital admission was the result of a bowel perforation most likely caused by
the centre lap belt. Forty three percent of crash participants were uninjured.
The injury severity for all crash participants, divided into those occupying struck or striking
vehicles is shown in Table 3.9. It can be seen that the occupants of struck vehicles were
more likely to require hospital treatment (58%) than the occupants of striking vehicles
(34%).
Table 3.9
Rear end crash participants by crash injury severity
Crash injury severity Striking Striking % Struck Struck %
Fatal 0 0.0 0 0.0
Admitted to hospital 1 2.0 0 0.0
Treated at hospital 16 32.0 30 58.0
Treated by doctor/minor 5 10.0 6 11.5
No injury 28 56.0 16 30.5
Total 50 100.0 52 100.0
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The information provided in Table 3.9 can be further categorised according to seating
position (Table 3.10). It can be seen that over half of the vehicle occupants requiring hospital
treatment were the drivers of struck vehicles.
Table 3.10
Rear end crash participants by crash injury severity
Occupant position Admitted Hospital Treated Doctor/minor No injury
Striking:
Driver/rider 0 13 4 21
Left front passenger 0 1 0 3
Left rear passenger 0 1 0 1
Centre rear passenger 1 0 1 0
Right rear passenger 0 1 0 3
Total 1 16 5 28
Struck:
Driver 0 24 3 11
Left front passenger 0 3 3 4
Left rear passenger 0 2 0 1
Centre rear passenger 0 0 0 0
Right rear passenger 0 1 0 0
Total 0 30 6 16
Overall total 1 46 11 44
The most common injury types that led crash participants to seek medical treatment at a
hospital were neck pain or headache. Although these injury types were seen across struck
and striking vehicle occupants, they were more common among those in struck vehicles.
Eighteen drivers and three passengers of struck vehicles sought medical treatment for neck
pain or headache, compared to only two drivers and three vehicle occupants of striking
vehicles.
Chest or shoulder pain that was associated with seatbelt usage was the next most common
injury type for participants involved in rear end collisions. This type of injury was evenly
distributed between striking vehicle and struck vehicle occupants. The two motorcycle
riders sustained abrasions and contusions resulting from contact with the ground after the
initial impact.
3.3.6 Vehicle type
Of struck vehicles, 90 percent were cars or car derivatives. Less than 66 percent of striking
vehicles were car derivatives, however, with greater involvement of large trucks, passenger
buses and motorcycles than was the case among struck vehicles (see Table 3.11). There
was little difference in vehicle age between struck or striking vehicles. The median age of
striking vehicles was 11.5 years and that of struck vehicles was 12.5 years. The median age
for vehicles on South Australian roads is 11.6 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2005).
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Table 3.11
Vehicle types involved in the rear end crashes investigated
Vehicle type Striking vehicle Struck vehicle Striking (%) Struck (%)
Car or car derivative* 25 34 65.8 89.5
SUV 2 1 5.3 2.6
Van 3 2 7.9 5.3
Small truck 0 1 0.0 2.6
Large truck 3 0 7.9 0.0
Bus 3 0 7.9 0.0
Motorcycle 2 0 5.3 0.0
Total 38 38 100.0 100.0
* Sedans, hatches, station wagons
3.3.7 Movement of the struck vehicles
Thirty-five of the struck vehicles in this study (92.1%) were stationary at the time of being
struck. In 15 of these cases, the struck vehicle was stationary at a signalised intersection.
Although the majority of these crashes occurred within close proximity to the intersection,
approximately one third of the struck vehicles were stopped more than 100 metres away
from the intersection due to traffic congestion, the furthest distance being approximately
400 metres.
In nine other cases, the struck vehicle had become stationary on a major road while waiting
for oncoming traffic to clear before undertaking a right hand turn into another road. In one
case, the struck vehicle had moved through a signalised intersection but became stationary
in response to traffic congestion ahead. Other reasons for struck vehicles becoming
stationary included: a long line of congested traffic ahead without the presence of a
signalised intersection, stopping at a pedestrian-activated crossing, and one case where the
struck vehicle was waiting in a ‘Turn Left with Care’ lane. Additionally, there were three
cases in which vehicles became stationary due to unexpected events ahead of them that
required that they stop.
There were only three cases in which the struck vehicles were moving at the time of the
rear-end collision. In each of these cases, the vehicle was travelling straight ahead, rather
than turning, when it was struck from behind by a faster moving vehicle.
3.3.8 Age and sex of the drivers/riders
Clear differences were seen in the sex and age characteristics of the drivers of striking
vehicles when compared with drivers of vehicles that were struck. Although the sex
distribution of drivers in struck vehicles was close to being evenly divided between males
(47%) and females (53%), the driver of a striking vehicle was more than twice as likely to
have been male (71%) rather than female (29%). The age distribution of drivers revealed a
greater likelihood of being involved in a rear-end crash as a striking driver when young. Half
of all striking drivers were aged between 16 and 35. For the drivers of struck vehicles,
drivers in this age group only accounted for 29 percent. Drivers aged 25 years or less
represented more than 26 percent of drivers of striking vehicles but only 13 percent of
struck drivers. Drivers over the age of 55 years were twice as likely to have been driving a
struck vehicle rather than a striking vehicle. Table 3.12 shows the age distributions of drivers
of striking vehicles and drivers of struck vehicles.
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Table 3.12
Age of drivers involved in the rear end crashes investigated
Driver age Striking vehicle Struck vehicle Striking (%) Struck (%)
16-25 10 5 26.3 13.2
26-35 9 6 23.7 15.8
36-45 7 9 18.4 23.7
46-55 7 8 18.4 21.0
56-65 2 7 5.3 18.4
66-75 2 2 5.3 5.3
76-85 1 1 2.6 2.6
Total 38 38 100.0 100.0
3.3.9 Licence status of drivers/riders
There was no significant difference in motor vehicle licence status between the drivers of
striking vehicles and the drivers of struck vehicles. Table 3.13 shows the breakdown of
drivers by licence category. Ten of the drivers of striking vehicles held additional licences
beyond a full car licence. These included three drivers who held a passenger transport
licence, two drivers who held a motor cycle licence, two who held a semi-articulated vehicle
and motorcycle licence, two who held road train licences and one who held a rigid truck
licence. Two drivers of struck vehicles held a small truck licence in addition to a full car
licence.
Table 3.13
Driver’s licence status of drivers involved in rear end crashes
Driver’s licence status Striking driver Struck driver
Full licence 34 35
Provisional licence 4 3
No licence 0 0
Total 38 38
3.3.10 Seatbelt use
Seat belt usage was checked and recorded at the scene of each crash investigated,
including the type of belt provided and objective evidence of usage, such as scuff and/or
kink marks. This information was supplemented by self-reported usage at the scene and in
follow-up crash participant interviews. In each of the rear end cases investigated, all vehicles
involved in the collision, excluding the motorcycles, were fitted with seat belts. In all but five
cases, the drivers and vehicle occupants were provided with inertia reel seat belts. Two
truck drivers were provided with two point static lap belts, one driver and passenger of an
early model vehicle were provided with three point static seat belts, and one centre rear
seat passenger was provided with a two point static lap belt. Objective and self-reported
evidence show that restraint usage was extremely high among drivers and vehicle
occupants in all crashes. There were only two vehicle occupants who were not restrained at
the time of the rear end collision, both of whom were drivers of striking trucks. In both
cases, the drivers stated that although they routinely used a restraint when driving a
standard motor vehicle, they never wore one while driving a truck.
3.3.11 Familiarity with the road
Crash participants who agreed to a post-crash interview were asked questions related to
frequency of use and knowledge of the road where the collision occurred. Of those drivers
who participated in interviews, 48 percent of struck drivers travelled on the road daily,
compared with 30 percent of striking drivers (see Table 3.14).
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Table 3.14
Self-reported familiarity with road of drivers
involved in the rear end crashes investigated
Familiarity Striking vehicle Struck vehicle Striking (%) Struck (%)
Drive daily 6 12 30.0 48.0
Familiar 10 11 50.0 44.0
Not well known 4 1 20.0 4.0
No knowledge 0 1 0.0 4.0
No interview given 18 13 - -
Total 38 38 100.0 100.0
3.3.12 Previous involvement in road crashes
Levels of previous involvement in road crashes were ascertained for the drivers in the rear
end collisions by cross-referencing their driver’s licences with crash records contained
within the TARS database. The use of TARS enabled determination of drivers’ previous
involvement in police-reported crashes in South Australia between 1981 and 2004. It also
enabled examination of responsibility for the crash.
Table 3.15 shows the number of crashes each of the drivers had recorded in the TARS
database prior to their involvement in the rear end crash investigated. There was very little
difference between drivers of striking vehicles and drivers of struck vehicles with regard to
previous crash involvement, although it must be noted that the younger average age of the
drivers of striking vehicles means that they would have had less previous exposure to crash
risk than the drivers of struck vehicles. More than 50 percent of all drivers had no recorded
crash history prior to their involvement in this collision. Around nine percent of drivers
involved in the study had a history of four or more crashes. With regard to responsibility for
previous crashes, drivers of striking vehicles were deemed by the investigating police
officers to have been at fault in 75 percent of their crashes, compared to struck drivers who
were deemed to have been at fault in 63 percent of cases.
Table 3.15
Previous crash involvement of drivers involved in the rear end
crashes investigated, by crash responsibility
Number of crashes Striking vehicle Struck vehicle Striking (%) Struck (%)
None 22 19 58.0 50.0
One 6 7 15.7 18.4
Two 7 6 18.4 15.7
Three 0 2 0.0 5.3
Four 3 2 7.9 5.3
Five 0 2 0.0 5.3
Total 38 38 100.0 100.0
3.3.13 Previous involvement in rear end crashes
In addition to the analysis of previous involvement in crashes overall, the TARS database
was also checked to determine the number of striking and struck drivers who had been
involved in previous rear end crashes. Eleven drivers of striking vehicles had a history of 14
previous rear end crashes. Of these 14 crashes, it was found that 12 (86%) were
considered by police to be the result of an error by this driver. The most common faults
identified by police in these crashes were inattention, driving too closely and driving without
due care. In contrast, 12 drivers of struck vehicles had a history of 22 previous rear end
crashes. Of these 22 crashes, only eight (36%) were adjudged by police to have occurred as
a result of driver error for this driver. The greater likelihood of the drivers of striking vehicles
being responsible for previous rear end crashes was statistically significant (χ2(1)
 = 8.4, p <
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.01). Individual driver crash history will be discussed in more detail, where relevant, as the
rear end crashes are explored further in the next section of this report.
3.4 Results: Contributing factors to rear end crashes
During the course of the investigation of the collisions, the various factors that may have
contributed to the crash were examined. This evaluation was based on evidence collected at
the crash scene and information collected in interviews with drivers, occupants, police and
witnesses following the collision.
Many of the rear-end crashes investigated were found to share common contributing
factors. Included among these were issues related to road infrastructure and others related
to human factors. The following section provides a summary of the common factors
contributing to the rear end crashes investigated, with crash examples given for each factor.
As some crashes had more than one contributing factor, individual crashes may be
discussed on more than one occasion. The contributing factor of following too closely, often
cited by police as causing rear end crashes, is not included in this section because its role in
the crashes was difficult to establish with any confidence. Significant prior crash records of
drivers and crash sites are included in crash descriptions where relevant.
3.4.1 Inadequate allocation of attention
There is considerable evidence to suggest that many of the rear end crashes investigated
occurred as a result, at least partly, of the inadequate allocation of attention by the striking
driver. Inadequate allocation of attention occurred in a number of different ways. One such
way involved the failure to allocate sufficient attention to the overall driving task. Drivers in
these cases were pre-occupied with something else (e.g. emotional distress) and were not
concentrating on driving. These crashes are classified here as being due to ‘inattention’. A
second form of inadequate allocation of attention was that of ‘distraction’. In these cases,
the drivers were involved in a crash because they were distracted by visual stimuli in the
environment, either outside or inside the vehicle (e.g. street directory, lighting a cigarette),
which meant that they were not looking at the road. Thirdly, inadequate allocation of
attention often resulted from a failure to adequately divide attention between two driving-
related tasks. Such crashes would result, for example, from drivers looking at rear vision
mirrors and noticing too late that traffic ahead had become stationary. A final sub-category
relates specifically to lane changes in which the drivers failed to observe that their lane
change was unsafe because of slow or stationary traffic ahead of them in the lane into
which they were changing. These crashes therefore involved adequate division of attention
between traffic directly ahead in the original lane and traffic behind in the new lane but
insufficient allocation of attention to observing traffic ahead in the new lane.
There were several cases in which inadequate allocation of attention was suspected but
was unable to be confirmed through interviews. These cases have been omitted from this
section.
INATTENTION
There were three cases, which were classified as being the result of ‘inattention’. That is,
the drivers did not allocate enough attention to the driving task. These cases are described
below.
Crash M070:
The striking vehicle was being driven by a driver who reported that her attention to the
driving task was severely impaired due to external stressors that had been escalating in the
days leading up to the collision. She took little evasive action prior to colliding with a vehicle
that had been stationary for some time. For a full description of this crash, see Section
3.4.3.
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Crash M134:
The struck vehicle became stationary behind other vehicles at a red traffic signal and was
stationary for several seconds before it was struck by a vehicle under braking. The driver of
the striking vehicle stated that the traffic ahead appeared to become congested suddenly
without her being aware of it. She reported that the collision must have occurred as a result
of inattention but was unable to account for her lapse in concentration prior to the collision.
Crash M162:
The driver of the striking vehicle had been aware that a vehicle ahead had slowed and was
indicating to turn right as he approached. The road was relatively free of other traffic and the
driver stated that he expected the vehicle to have negotiated the turn before he arrived at its
position. He made no further observation of that vehicle. The driver stated further that he
was unaware of his involvement in the collision until the airbag deployed. He could not
account for failing to observe that the vehicle was still in position, waiting to turn.
DISTRACTION
There were eight cases in which the drivers of the striking vehicles were distracted from the
driving task, and specifically from the observation of other traffic. The distracters included
objects or events either within the vehicle or part of the road or roadside environment. The
distractors inside vehicles included a street directory (on two occasions), a bus timetable, a
cigarette, and a mobile phone. Distractors outside of the vehicle included a new housing
development, road workers, and a load of plastic bottles spilled on the road.
Crash M007:
The driver in this case was an interstate visitor who had just commenced her road journey
back to Sydney. She was driving her own vehicle. The driver was uncertain of the correct
path to get to the South Eastern Freeway and was seeking assistance from the left front
seat passenger, who was giving directions from an open street directory. The driver was
aware of a vehicle ahead of her that was travelling at a normal speed. The driver of the
striking vehicle glanced down at the open street directory for an estimated two to three
seconds. During this time, the driver ahead indicated his intention to turn right into a side
street, brought the vehicle to a stop, and was waiting for oncoming traffic to clear. On
redirecting her attention to the road ahead, the driver of the striking vehicle was confronted
with the stationary vehicle, with little time to undertake evasive action, and a collision
occurred.
Crash M042:
The striking vehicle in this case was a large metropolitan passenger bus being driven by a
bus driver who was familiar with the road. The traffic ahead of the bus was congested but
moving, when the driver of the bus directed his attention to a bus timetable positioned on
the dashboard near the steering wheel. On returning his attention to the roadway ahead, the
bus driver was confronted with a line of stationary vehicles that had stopped for a red traffic
signal at an intersection. The bus driver attempted to brake but was unable to avoid a rear
end collision with the vehicle ahead.
Crash M075:
The attention of the driver of the striking vehicle in this case was directed to other activities,
including lighting a cigarette, when he accelerated into the rear of a stationary vehicle ahead
of his. For a full description of this crash, see Section 3.4.3.
Crash M102:
The driver of the striking vehicle in this case reported that he had been distracted from the
driving task and that this was not an uncommon feature of his driving habits. The vehicle
was in the right lane, travelling behind at least two other vehicles that were approaching a
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signalised intersection with a green light. The striking driver’s attention was drawn to a new
housing development to the left of the carriageway for an unknown period of time. On
redirecting his attention ahead, the driver was confronted with the two vehicles that were
now stationary at a red traffic signal, with less than two metres between his and the last
stationary vehicle. The driver braked but was unable to avoid a collision with this vehicle.
The driver of the striking vehicle had a history of four crashes in the previous six years,
including two rear end collisions in 2000. The driver was deemed by police to have been at
fault in both of these rear end collisions due to ‘following too closely’.
Crash M113:
The driver of the striking vehicle in this case had been using a hand held mobile phone at
the time of the collision. The call was still connected when bystanders offered assistance to
the injured driver. For a full description of the crash, see Section 3.4.4.
Crash M127:
The driver of the striking vehicle in this case was travelling along a single lane road that was
unfamiliar to him. He was accompanied by three peers and together they were attempting
to give him directions to a takeaway food venue that none of them knew well. The front
seat passenger was providing directions from an open street directory and the driver was
occasionally glancing toward the book as he drove. For full details of the crash, see Section
3.4.6.
Crash M152:
The collision occurred on a single lane local road immediately beyond a rough, slightly raised
railway crossing. As the driver of the striking vehicle approached the railway crossing, he
was confronted with a number of road work vehicles and road workers who were erecting
signs at the edge of the road. He reported being distracted by the number of workers and
the noise they were making as the signs were thrown from their vehicles. For a full
description of this crash, see Section 3.4.6.
Crash M256:
The striking vehicle in this case was the fourth in a platoon of vehicles in the left lane. The
vehicles moved together through a signalised intersection on a green light without needing
to alter their speed. As the platoon of vehicles negotiated a blind left hand bend, the drivers
were confronted with a load of plastic bottles that had spilled onto the road. All of the
drivers reported that the bottles were a considerable distraction as they travelled over them
or were flicked up onto their vehicles by the preceding vehicle. After negotiating a path over
the bottles, the drivers were then confronted with a stationary vehicle ahead and braked to a
stop without incident. The striking vehicle, however, was still travelling through the hazard
as it exited the bend and approached the stationary vehicles immediately ahead. The driver
attempted to brake but was unable to avoid hitting the rear vehicle, which subsequently
struck the next vehicle in the line (see Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1
Vehicles involved in Crash M256
INADEQUATE DIVISION OF ATTENTION
There were five crashes that were classified as being the result of inadequate division of
attention. These cases are described below.
Crash M087:
The two vehicles had become stationary in a ‘Turn Left With Care’ lane and were attempting
to turn into traffic on a busy road. On seeing a gap in the through traffic, the driver of the
striking vehicle accelerated and collided with the rear of the still stationary lead vehicle. The
driver of the striking vehicle stated that the gap was adequate for both vehicles to enter the
flow of traffic and so assumed that the lead vehicle had moved forward but did not look
ahead to confirm this before accelerating.
Crash M111:
The striking vehicle in this case was a large truck carrying nine tonnes of crushed concrete.
The driver of the vehicle stated that he was worried about the time he needed to complete
a work task and potential delays in his progress that could be caused by impending
inclement weather. The driver was travelling in the left lane and was aware of a vehicle
some distance ahead of him. As the truck approached a pedestrian-activated crossing, the
lights changed to amber and then red. The truck driver diverted his attention from the road
as he looked for pedestrians. On seeing that there were no pedestrians in the vicinity, he
then directed his attention again to the road ahead where he was confronted with the
stationary vehicle at the crossing. The driver braked but was unable to avoid the collision. He
stated that he expected the vehicle ahead to have travelled through the crossing and so he
did not look at it again until immediately before the collision. It appeared from the
investigation that the truck driver intended to drive through the red signal if no pedestrians
were present. This would mean that intent to break the law also contributed to the crash but
this intent on the part of the driver could not be ascertained with certainty. The driver of the
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striking vehicle had a history of three crashes in the previous ten years. In two of these, the
driver was deemed by police to have been at fault, both times because of ‘inattention’. All
three of these crashes occurred when driving a car rather than a truck.
Crash M132:
The striking vehicle in this case was a large gas transport truck that was not carrying a load
at the time of the collision. The truck was travelling down a descending road in the centre of
a platoon of vehicles that was travelling at the speed limit. The driver considered that a safe
distance was maintained between his vehicle and the vehicle directly ahead at that time. He
noted that there were road works some distance ahead and was seeking to change lanes.
His attention was directed to his left side mirrors for an estimated two to three seconds as
he judged the space available to undertake the manoeuvre safely. He realised that there
was no available space to undertake the manoeuvre and elected to stay in the lane he was
travelling in. On redirecting his attention to the road ahead, he was confronted with vehicles
that were now almost stationary because of a red traffic signal much further ahead. He
braked solidly but was unable to avoid colliding with the vehicle directly ahead that, in turn,
struck the rear of a stationary vehicle ahead of it.
Crash M166:
The driver of the striking vehicle in this case was travelling in a platoon of vehicles. The
traffic ahead of him was moving when he diverted his attention to his rear vision mirror. On
redirecting his attention ahead, he was confronted with a long line of stationary vehicles that
were now queuing for the signalised intersection four hundred metres ahead. He braked but
was unable to avoid the collision. For more details of this crash, see Section 3.4.4 ‘Parking
on arterial roads’).
Crash M174:
The driver of the striking vehicle involved in this collision was attempting to exit a
designated right turn lane and enter the through lane to his left in heavy traffic. The driver
was familiar with the road and reported that he had been swapping between the centre and
right lanes on several occasions in the lead up to the collision. He stated that he had
undertaken this manoeuvre on other occasions without incident but that, on this occasion,
the traffic was more congested due to road closures elsewhere. The driver was travelling
behind a long line of vehicles that were travelling at a constant speed when he directed his
attention to the left side mirror to look for an opening to once again change lanes. Despite
indicating his desire to change lanes, no gap became available. The driver directed his
attention back to the road ahead and was confronted by the now stationary vehicles that
were queuing some distance from the signalised intersection. The driver braked hard but
was unable to avoid a collision.
UNSAFE LANE CHANGES ASSOCIATED WITH INADEQUATE ALLOCATION OF ATTENTION
There were four crashes in which drivers made lane changes that, due to inadequate
allocation of attention, resulted in rear end collisions with vehicles ahead of them. These
crashes are described below.
Crash M168:
This collision occurred just past a railway crossing. Prior to the collision, the vehicles
involved had been held up at the railway crossing by two consecutive trains before being
able to continue through. The driver of the striking vehicle reported at the scene that he had
been frustrated by this long delay. There were vehicles ahead of the striking vehicle in both
lanes, including two vehicles in the right lane. The lead of these two vehicles indicated an
intention to turn right into a side street approximately 200 metres beyond the railway
crossing. Both vehicles were stationary for some time. The striking vehicle moved into the
right lane from the left and, on entering the lane, the driver was confronted with the two
stationary vehicles. The driver of the striking vehicle had not been aware of the presence of
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the stationary vehicles before changing lanes. The driver braked but was unable to avoid
colliding with the rear of the two vehicles, which subsequently struck the vehicle ahead. The
driver of the striking vehicle had a history of one previous rear end crash in 2001. The driver
was deemed by police to have been at fault in this previous collision due to ‘driving too
closely’.
Crash M175:
The driver of the striking vehicle had limited experience driving in metropolitan Adelaide.
While travelling up a steep gradient, the driver became aware of a vehicle ahead of him that
he claims was making frequent lane changes. He moved into the right lane to avoid conflict
with this vehicle. The driver of the striking vehicle was unaware that a collision was
imminent with a stationary vehicle in the right lane that was queued at an intersection, and
so he took no evasive action. He stated that he was not aware that he was approaching a
signalised intersection or that there was a vehicle in the right lane.
Crash M249:
The striking vehicle was travelling in the left of two lanes behind other vehicles when the
driver noted the vehicle ahead was slowing down and indicating to turn left into a side
street. The driver decided to change into the right lane and diverted his attention to his right
side mirror to check for a gap in the traffic. The driver successfully changed into the right
lane but was immediately confronted with a stationary vehicle waiting to turn right. The
driver had little time to undertake evasive action and collided with the rear of the stationary
vehicle. Although the stationary vehicle had been waiting to execute the turn for
approximately one minute, the driver of the striking vehicle stated that he was not aware of
the stationary vehicle’s presence at any time prior to changing lanes.
Crash M286:
The striking vehicle was a large metropolitan passenger bus that had no passengers at the
time of the collision. The bus driver had been travelling in the left lane behind another
passenger bus when the driver of that vehicle indicated its intention to stop and collect
passengers. The driver of the striking vehicle looked in his right rear mirror to check for
vehicles that might be travelling behind him as he negotiated a lane change. On entering the
right lane, the driver was immediately confronted with vehicle that was stationary while the
driver waited to execute a right turn into a side street. The driver was not aware of the
presence of the stationary vehicle before changing lanes. The bus driver veered left and
braked but was unable to avoid the stationary vehicle. The driver of the striking vehicle had a
history of four crashes, including one rear end collision in 1986. In all of these crashes, the
driver was driving a taxi. The driver was deemed by the police to have been at fault in the
previous rear end collision due to ‘inattention’.
3.4.2 No designated right turn lanes
Eleven of the 38 collisions included in this study occurred when a vehicle became stationary
while waiting to turn right into another road and was struck by a vehicle travelling behind. In
each of these cases, the drivers of the turning vehicles had indicated their intentions
appropriately. Seven of these collisions occurred on four lane carriageways, including five on
major arterial routes that carry traffic volumes in the vicinity of 19,000-33,000 vehicles per
day (Annual Average Daily Traffic Estimates - 24 hour 2 way flows. TSA Transport
Information Management Section - July 2002).
Designated right turn lanes allow right hand turn movements for vehicles to occur in a more
protected manner and additionally allow for freer, unobstructed movement of through
vehicles. There was one case in which a designated turning lane was provided but the
storage capacity of the lane was not adequate to cater for the volume of traffic that was
using the lane. The collision in this case occurred when the struck vehicle was partly in the
through lane.
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REAR END COLLISIONS WITH RIGHT TURNING VEHICLES ON ARTERIAL ROADS
There were five crashes involving rear end collisions with right turning vehicles on arterial
roads. They are described below, and the average daily traffic counts for each road are
provided.
Crash M003:
Average daily traffic measurement for the carriageway: 24,200 vehicles.
The turning vehicle was stationary in the single northbound lane waiting for oncoming traffic
to clear before undertaking a turn into a side street. It was struck from behind by a vehicle
travelling straight ahead. It is likely that parked vehicles at the kerbside may have reduced
the width of carriageway available for traffic but this could not be confirmed. The driver of
the striking vehicle failed to see that the vehicle ahead had become stationary and there
was no evasive action taken prior to the collision. The road at this crash site has undergone
extensive modification since the collision and now provides two lanes for through traffic and
a designated right turn lane.
Crash M007:
Average daily traffic measurement for the carriageway: 24,000 vehicles.
The turning vehicle had been in the right lane for some time before becoming stationary, as
the driver waited for a safe opportunity to turn right. For a full description of this crash, see
Section 3.4.1 (‘Driver distraction’).
Crash M061:
Average daily traffic measurement for the carriageway: 24,600 vehicles.
The struck vehicle was stationary at an intersection while the driver waited for a gap in
oncoming traffic that would allow a right turn. For a full description of the crash, see Section
3.4.4 (‘Parking on arterial roads’).
Crash M154:
Average daily traffic measurement for the carriageway: 33,100 vehicles.
The turning vehicle was in the right lane for several hundred metres before the driver
indicated his intention to move into a designated right turn lane. The turning lane catered for
vehicles entering a large retail outlet. The lane was congested with a large number of
vehicles and so the turning vehicle was forced to wait in a position that partially obstructed
the normal flow of traffic in the right through lane. The motorcyclist travelling behind the
turning vehicle, who is likely to have anticipated clearance of the through lane, collided with
the rear of the turning vehicle. The rider skidded across both lanes in front of other through
traffic before coming to rest on the raised kerb (see Figure 3.2). The young male rider had a
history of four crashes in the previous ten years, one of which was a rear end collision. The
rider was deemed by police to have been at fault in three of these four collisions, two as a
result of inattention and one as a result of driving without due care. All of the previous
crashes occurred when driving a car rather than as a motorcyclist.
Crash M286:
Average daily traffic measurement for the carriageway: 18,700 vehicles.
For a description of this crash, see Section 3.4.1 (‘Unsafe lane changes associated with
inadequate allocation of attention’).
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REAR END COLLISIONS WITH RIGHT TURNING VEHICLES ON NON-ARTERIAL, SINGLE LANE ROADS
Four rear end collisions occurred where a right turning vehicle had become stationary on a
non-arterial, single lane road. In all but one of these cases, the carriageway was not wide
enough to allow through vehicles to pass on the left of the turning vehicle. These four
crashes are listed below.
Crash M070:
The struck vehicle in this case had become stationary as a result of another vehicle that was
stationary while the driver waited to undertake a right turn into a side street. The lane width
was four metres, making it impossible for vehicles to pass the turning vehicle on the left.
For a full description of this crash, see Section 3.4.3.
Crash M127:
The driver of the struck vehicle in this case was waiting to turn right from a single lane road.
For full details of the crash, see Section 3.4.6.
Crash M152:
The collision occurred on a single lane local road immediately beyond a rough, slightly raised
railway crossing. For a full description of the crash, see Section 3.4.6.
Crash M162:
This collision occurred on a wide straight road that allowed good vision of vehicles ahead.
The struck vehicle had been stationary for several seconds while the driver waited for a safe
opportunity to turn right. For a full description of the crash, see Section 3.4.1 (‘Inattention’).
Figure 3.2
Crash site for M154 showing the right turn lane and tyre marks associated with the crash
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3.4.3 Health issues of drivers of striking vehicles
Five of the striking drivers involved in the rear end collisions had a confirmed health problem
that was likely to have played a role in their crash involvement. These included both physical
and mental problems and at least two cases involved a drug-related component. No drivers
of struck vehicles were found to have any health problems that played a role in their crash
involvement. The five crashes involving driver health issues are described below.
Crash M050:
The driver of the striking vehicle had a long-standing and current history of sleep disturbance
secondary to significant depression that had escalated over the preceding weeks. The driver
was on her way home after attending a medical appointment where she was prescribed a
sedative (Stillnox). The driver had obtained the prescription and taken two tablets before her
journey home. The vehicle was seen by a witness in a following vehicle to drift across both
lanes before accelerating into the rear of a slower moving vehicle ahead of it. The driver had
no memory of the collision and this, combined with the drifting across lanes, suggests the
possibility that the driver may have fallen asleep at the wheel. Significantly, this driver had a
similar crash under the same circumstances one month prior to this collision. Medical
reports post-collision noted that the driver had a recent history of suicide attempts but
concluded that this collision (M050) was not the result of a suicide attempt.
Crash M070:
The driver of the striking vehicle had a long-standing and current history of both physical and
mental health issues. She reported that her mental health status at the time of the collision
was very poor as a result of a family break-up and associated difficult custody battle. The
driver reported that these issues were her primary concern at the time and a significant
distraction immediately preceding the collision. The driver proceeded over a small crest
(insufficient to constitute a significant visual obstruction) and collided with the rear of the
last of a long line of stationary vehicles that had stopped because the driver of the lead
vehicle was waiting to undertake a right hand turn. The driver of the striking vehicle took
little evasive action prior to the collision. She is known to have been prescribed
antidepressant and anxiolytic (anxiety-reducing) medications at the time of the collision. She
was reluctant to discuss the timing of administration of these medications in relation to the
collision.
Crash M075:
The driver of the striking vehicle had a long standing and current history of illicit drug
use/abuse, including intravenous use of morphine, and reported use of medications prior to
driving that is likely to have impaired his driving abilities. He reported that he had consumed
8-10milligrams of Xanax prior to driving on the day of the crash. Xanax is a member of the
anxiolytic family and is known to cause increased reaction time and drowsiness (MIMS
Australia, 2005). The self-reported dose taken by the driver is at the upper level of daily
therapeutic use, and had been consumed over a four hour period. The driver states that his
drug usage at the time was escalating, and that he had been taking various drugs including
marijuana and methamphetamine, but denied use of these or other substances on the day
of the collision. The driver of the striking vehicle in this case was aware that traffic was
congested as a result of a signalised intersection ahead and his vehicle had been stationary
behind other vehicles for a short period of time. While stationary, the driver’s attention was
directed to other activities, including lighting a cigarette. The driver of the striking vehicle
glimpsed some movement in the vehicle ahead and, while looking down, he accelerated
into the rear of this vehicle that had once again become stationary. The driver of the striking
vehicle had a history of two rear end crashes in the previous eight years. In both of these
cases the driver was deemed by police to have been at fault due to ‘inattention’.
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Crash M109:
The driver of the striking vehicle in this case had Insulin Requiring Diabetes Mellitus. The
driver reported that early in the driving journey he ‘felt flat’. The driver misinterpreted the
actions of vehicles ahead as they slowly moved forward in a long line of congested traffic.
He began to accelerate, colliding with the rear of the forward vehicle that had once again
become stationary. Following the rear-end collision, paramedics took a blood glucose
reading from the driver and he was subsequently given a glucose drink, suggesting that his
blood glucose level was very likely to be below or at the lower level of the normal range (i.e.
hypoglycaemic) at the time of the collision. This hypoglycaemia was likely to have impaired
his judgement.
Crash M184:
The driver of the striking vehicle in this case was pregnant at the time of the collision
(gestation 9 weeks). She reported that she was feeling unwell and was attempting to drive
home because of this. She fainted while driving and ran into the rear of a vehicle that was
stationary at a red traffic signal. The driver had a history of frequent fainting at this same
gestational stage of pregnancy.
3.4.4 Parking on arterial roads
There were three cases in which parked vehicles on the road contributed in some way to
the crash occurring. In each of these cases, the road carried high traffic volumes, with a
range between 24,000 and 51,000 vehicles per day (Annual Average Daily Traffic Estimates -
24 hour 2 way flows. TSA Transport Information Management Section - July 2002). These
three crashes are described below.
Crash M061:
This crash occurred on a major arterial route (average daily traffic of 24,600 vehicles). A truck
driver moved his truck into the left lane in response to seeing a vehicle that was stationary
while the driver waited to turn right into a side street. The truck driver was confronted with
a large parked vehicle and so moved back to the right lane and attempted to drive between
the two vehicles but failed, colliding with the vehicle in the right turn lane. The road,
recognised as being a major thoroughfare, carries a Clearway restriction for traffic between
1600 and 1800 hours. This collision occurred between 1500 and 1600 hours, a period not
covered by the restriction but a time period when traffic volumes at the site are rapidly
increasing.
Crash M113:
This crash occurred immediately beyond a sweeping, partially blind, left hand bend on a 70
kilometre per hour speed limit road that carries constant heavy traffic for most times of the
day (average daily traffic measurement of 30,200 vehicles). Additionally, the site features
merging lanes coming in from another major road on the right. In response to these, there
are No Parking zones around the merge lane area. The collision occurred when vehicles
came around the bend and were confronted with an unexpected parked vehicle. This vehicle
was parked immediately forward of the No Parking area but forced traffic in the left lane to
become stationary in the blind section of the bend where parking is prohibited. The driver of
the striking vehicle may have reasonably expected the lane to be clear but instead was
confronted with stationary vehicles and a collision occurred. As noted earlier (see Section
3.4.1 ‘Distraction’), the driver was also using a hand held mobile phone at the time of the
collision.
Crash M166:
Although this case does not technically involve a parked vehicle, the collision was more
likely to happen because of the constant use of the left lane of the road as a parking area by
local businesses and their patrons. The stretch of road on which the crash occurred is a
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major arterial route with an average daily traffic volume of 51,200 vehicles. There is a long
designated right turn lane that has good storage capacity for turning vehicles and there are
two lanes designated for through vehicles. For the majority of the day, outside of Clearway
restrictions between 1630 and 1800 hours, the left lane of the road is congested with
parked vehicles, effectively restricting this major route to a single lane that carries a
constant large volume of traffic. The driver of the striking vehicle in this instance was
inattentive while checking his rear vision mirror (see Section 3.4.1 ‘Inadequate division of
attention’). The driver failed to recognise that the heavily congested lane was slowing in
response to traffic queuing for a red signal several hundred metres ahead. The vehicle
collided with the rear of the last stationary vehicle in that line, forcing the struck vehicle into
the vehicle ahead. This short stretch of road is a common site for rear end crashes, with
approximately four such crashes being reported to police in each of the years between 2000
and 2004 (TARS database: 2000=3 2001=4 2002=3 2003=4 2004=4).
3.4.5 Unexpected events on the road
In each of these three cases, the forward vehicle(s) stopped suddenly on the road and the
striking vehicle collided with the rear of the vehicle immediately ahead. Although it could be
argued that the driver of the striking vehicle was responsible for the collision due to
inattention or following too closely, it could also be argued that, given the lack of traffic
congestion on the roads involved, the drivers could not have anticipated that their
movement would be suddenly halted.
Crash M019:
This crash was due to the combination of the striking driver’s vision of the road ahead being
restricted by a truck and the unexpected braking of the truck in response to a reversing
vehicle in the lane ahead. In this case, the struck vehicle, a small truck, came to a sudden
stop on a lightly trafficked road because another vehicle was reversing in the lane ahead. It
is thought by the truck driver that the driver of the reversing vehicle had ‘overshot’ his or her
desired turn and chosen to reverse some distance on the road. This driver of the reversing
vehicle fled the scene and so could not be interviewed. The driver of the striking vehicle,
whose vision ahead of the truck was restricted (see Figure 3.3), failed to recognise that the
truck had suddenly stopped until too close to undertake effective braking and so ran into the
rear of the stationary truck. The driver of the striking vehicle had a history of two crashes in
the previous four years. He was deemed by police to have been at fault in one of these
collisions.
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Figure 3.3
Truck struck in the rear in Crash M019
Crash M129:
The driver of the struck vehicle in this case had a clear road for several hundred metres
ahead. However, a dog ran onto the road and the driver braked suddenly to avoid striking it.
The driver of the striking vehicle was not aware of the dog on the road and failed to observe
the sudden stopping of the forward vehicle until he was too close to undertake effective
braking, running into the rear of the now stationary vehicle ahead.
Crash M256:
The unexpected event on the road in this case was the presence of a stationary vehicle, the
driver of which was attempting to retrieve a fallen load of bottles. For a full description of
this crash, see Section 3.4.1 (‘Distraction’).
3.4.6 Miscellaneous infrastructure issues
Three rear end collisions occurred at sites that were complicated by other road features that
could have increased the likelihood of such collisions occurring. Although each of these
collisions could be argued to have occurred due to other contributing factors, such as
inadequate allocation of attention, they may have been less likely to occur if the road feature
in question had not been present. These three crashes are described below.
Crash M127:
The collision occurred when a right turning vehicle became stationary on a single lane road.
The side street that the vehicle was turning into is situated in the centre of a sweeping right
hand bend. Although it was estimated that the site distance around the bend, approximately
50 metres, should have provided adequate distance for a following vehicle to stop, it is
possible that a driver unfamiliar with the site may have believed that there was adequate
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room to travel to the left of a turning vehicle until much closer. This is not a site that would
be considered to be a high traffic volume area, yet three other rear end collisions under
similar circumstances have occurred at this site in the past nine years, and so the road
layout may at least be a partial contributor to their occurrence. As noted earlier (Section
3.4.1 ‘Distraction’), the driver of the striking vehicle was also distracted prior to the collision
by an open street directory held by the left front seat passenger.
Crash M152:
The collision occurred on a single lane local road immediately beyond a rough, slightly raised
railway crossing. The driver of the striking vehicle stated that he was aware of the presence
of another vehicle several car lengths ahead. The lead vehicle was travelling forward within
the speed limit at last sighting. The driver of the striking vehicle moved to the left side of the
roadway as he attempted to avoid the roughest area of a railway crossing, losing sight of the
other vehicle in the manoeuvre. On travelling over the crossing, the driver was immediately
confronted with the lead vehicle that was now stationary at a T-junction, its driver waiting to
execute a right hand turn. The T-junction is situated twelve metres beyond the crossing. The
driver of the striking vehicle braked but was unable to avoid colliding with the rear of the
stationary vehicle. In addition to possible driver distraction (see Section 3.4.1), the
combination of a sight restriction when avoiding the rough surface of the crossing, and the
location of a T-junction so close to the crossing, increased the likelihood of a collision such
as this. A map of the site for this crash is provided in Figure 3.4.
Crash M256:
Although an unsecured load and the presence of a stationary vehicle in the left lane were
the primary causal factors in this crash (see Sections 3.4.1 ‘Distraction’ and 3.4.5
‘Unexpected events on the road’), it was made more likely by the presence of a left hand
bend characterised by restricted vision. Roadside trees in close proximity to the carriageway
compromised sight distance around the bend (see Figure 3.5). Had the trees not been
present, the drivers of vehicles negotiating the bend would have had earlier warning of the
stationary vehicle and possibly the unsecured load.
Figure 3.4
Plan of the crash site for M152
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3.5 Summary
A sample of 38 rear end collisions has been investigated by CASR staff as part of the
metropolitan in-depth crash investigation study. In each case, detailed information was
collected about the vehicles, drivers, roads and other characteristics of the crash. This
enabled a better understanding of the factors contributing to the causation of rear end
crashes in Adelaide, South Australia. The rear end crashes investigated were typical of rear
end crashes in general, as they mostly occurred on straight level roads in good weather on
weekdays (see Section 2). Also, typically for rear end crashes, levels of injury were low. Of
interest was the greater likelihood of hospital treatment being required for the occupants of
struck vehicles rather than for those of striking vehicles.
The factor contributing most commonly to rear end collisions was the inadequate division of
attention. This inadequate division of attention, referred to in mass data sets as ‘inattention’,
took a number of different forms. It included cases in which drivers were not sufficiently
focused on the driving task, cases in which drivers were distracted from the driving task by
objects or events either in or outside the vehicle, cases in which the drivers were unable to
adequately divide their attention between two or more driving-related tasks, and cases in
which drivers were unable to adequately allocate their attention to appropriate aspects of
the road and traffic environment when changing lanes. There were a number of additional
cases in which some form of inadequate allocation of attention was suspected but the
inability in these cases to interview the driver of the striking vehicle meant that it was not
possible to confirm this suspicion.
Figure 3.5
Left hand bend prior to crash site for M256
Eleven of the 38 crashes involved a vehicle that was waiting to turn right. This suggests that
rear end collisions occur often because of insufficient protection of right turning vehicles.
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Indeed, there were four cases in which a right turning vehicle was struck on a major arterial
road without a designated right turn lane and another crash in which a designated right turn
lane was provided but was not of sufficient length to accommodate all of the vehicles
waiting to turn right at the time of the crash. In the latter case, the vehicle was forced to
remain stationary while protruding into a through lane, with the driver waiting for space to
become available in the designated right turn lane. Another four crashes occurred in which a
vehicle was struck when waiting to turn right from a single lane road, with insufficient room
for the striking vehicle to pass the turning vehicle on the left.
Other factors found to contribute to rear end collisions were health problems of drivers,
unexpected events (e.g. dog on the road), and congestion or restriction of possible vehicle
movements created by legally parked vehicles. There were also three cases in which vision
of the road ahead was restricted in some way, twice by a bend in the road and once by a
railway crossing.
It is also important to note that a number of crashes featured a combination of contributing
factors. As with other types of crash, rear end collisions are often multi-determined events,
with a combination of driver and road environment factors leading to the crash. This means
that successfully addressing any of the contributory factors would reduce crash numbers
associated with other factors. For example, better protection of right turning vehicles would
be expected to reduce the number of crashes associated with inadequate allocation of
attention.
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4 Literature review
Rear end crashes are known to be very common throughout highly motorised countries
(Andreassen et al., 1996; Kodaka, Otable, Urai, & Koike, 2003; Shinar, 2000), and this has
been reinforced by the analysis of crashes in South Australia presented in Section 2 of this
report. Given the high likelihood of rear end crashes causing costly whiplash injuries (Navin,
Zein, & Felipe, 2000; van Kampen, 2000), it would be useful to identify countermeasures
with a high likelihood of reducing the frequency and severity of such crashes. Possible
countermeasures for rear end crashes either require changes to roads, such as pavement
skid resistance treatments, or changes to vehicles, such as collision avoidance systems.
Literature concerned with these countermeasures is described and discussed in the
remainder of the section.
4.1 Road-based countermeasures
Road-based countermeasures can be used to reduce the frequency and severity of rear end
crashes in two different ways. The main broad type of road-based measure is the type that
is aimed at reducing the likelihood that a driver in a following vehicle perceives too late that
it is necessary to brake in order to avoid a collision with a lead vehicle. Countermeasures of
this type include changes to signage, signals, road alignment, and lane configuration. The
other type of countermeasure is one that aims to reduce the likelihood of late braking being
insufficient to stop two vehicles colliding. The main method of achieving this is the use of
skid resistant pavements.
4.1.1 Road design
As rear end collisions occur commonly at intersections (Andreassen et al., 1996; Wang,
Ieda, & Mannering, 2003, and see Section 2 of this report), substantial effort has been
expended in devising road infrastructure treatments likely to reduce rear end collisions at
intersections. Intersection infrastructure problems that increase the likelihood of rear end
collisions are mostly related to either (a) intersection designs that increase the likelihood of
the presence of stationary vehicles whose drivers are waiting to turn into an intersecting
road, or to (b) situations in which there is a high likelihood of the drivers of approaching
vehicles being unaware of stationary traffic queued at the intersection. There are a number
of road infrastructure treatments available for these problems.
The risk of rear end collisions at intersections can be increased by the presence of stationary
vehicles waiting to turn either left or right. If there are excessive rear end collisions involving
vehicles waiting to turn right, it may be that infrastructure at the intersection is insufficient
to cope with the volume of right-turning traffic. Solutions to this problem include relocating
the right turn to a different intersection, providing a right turn only lane, increasing the
storage capacity of the right turn lane so that turning vehicles are not forced to queue in
adjacent through lanes, and increasing the duration of right turn arrows. It may also be
necessary to avoid situations in which vehicles wait in a through lane just beyond an
intersection in order to turn right into a side road (Andreassen et al., 1996).
For left turning traffic, rear end collisions can be reduced by either making the left turn
manoeuvre easier, or by slowing traffic approaching the intersection in the left turn lane. The
former can be achieved by providing slip lanes on the road into which the left turning traffic
can turn, prior to merging with traffic on the intersecting road (suitable for high volume left
turn sites) (Aitken, Milvydas, & Barton, 1987). If this is not possible, then a large angle
should be used for the entry of the left turning vehicle into the intersecting road, which will
improve visibility of the traffic into which the turning vehicle must merge and, thus, aid
appropriate gap selection (Aitken et al., 1987; Wang et al., 2003). The speed of approaching
left turning vehicles can be reduced by realignment of the left turn slip lane (Andreassen et
al., 1996).
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The other main problem at intersections that leads to rear end collisions occurs when
drivers are not prepared for stationary traffic that is queued at the intersection. One factor
that may cause such a situation is restricted visibility of the intersection on an approaching
road. Such restrictions to visibility can be caused by either vertical (i.e. crests) or horizontal
curves prior to the intersection (Andreassen et al., 1996; Wang et al., 2003). Restrictions to
visibility of intersections can be avoided in the road planning stage by not placing traffic
signals or intersections directly after horizontal or vertical curves. Where an intersection is
already in place, rear end collisions can be reduced by placing signs on the approach to the
intersection, warning drivers in advance of the possibility of queued stationary traffic. For
intersections where this is a regular problem, permanent signs may be appropriate, but
variable message signs are also an option (Andreassen et al., 1996). The use of variable
message signs could also aid in reducing the likelihood of rear end collisions at the scene of
roadworks. On freeways or highways, vehicles are travelling at high speed and drivers are
not expecting queued stationary traffic, as can occur at roadworks. For this reason, there is
value in using variable message signs preceding the roadworks, warning of queued traffic.
The placement of these warning signs is crucial, however. It is important that the message
signs are not placed at a distance prior to the roadworks which could be exceeded by the
length of the traffic queue but it is also important that the sign not be placed so far prior to
the roadworks that the message loses its relevance for the motorists at whom it is directed
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2001).
At intersections, it may not be a visual obstruction that causes problems, but low traffic
signal visibility. Means of increasing traffic signal visibility include putting signal heads on a
mast arm, using larger lenses, and using a greater number of signal heads. The latter
countermeasure decreases the likelihood that traffic signals at an intersection will fall
outside a driver’s central field of view or be obscured by a large vehicle in an adjacent lane
(Ogden (1996) in Navin et al., 2000). A study in Canada of changes in crash occurrence at
signalised intersections after the addition of a second primary traffic signal head found cost-
effective reductions in crashes overall, with the greatest crash reductions being for rear end
collisions (Navin et al., 2000).
Another means of reducing the risk of rear end collisions at intersections is the introduction
of clearway and parking restrictions on approaches to intersections. This will enhance
visibility of the intersection and other traffic, and also reduce obstacles in the vicinity of the
intersection that could cause vehicles to stop (Ogden (1996) in Navin et al., 2000).
Pedestrians crossing when not expected by drivers may also be a problem. If the nature of
the problem is poor conspicuity of the pedestrian crossing, then additional lighting and the
provision of warning signs may be useful (Ogden (1996) in Navin et al., 2000). If the problem
is pedestrians crossing illegally, then the use of fences on the median could be used to
discourage this behaviour (Wang et al., 2003).
Other situations that increase the likelihood of rear end crashes are lane drops where
visibility is restricted, particularly lane drops at the other side of an intersection, and freeway
on-ramps and off-ramps being in close proximity to one another. The latter results in rear
end collisions because it leads to drivers changing lanes and braking in front of one another,
which, in turn, leads to chain reactions of braking back through the freeway traffic. The
problem of ramps being too close to one another can also be exacerbated by sight distance
restrictions (Andreassen et al., 1996).
4.1.2 Pavement skid resistance
Even if appropriate traffic engineering is adopted to reduce rear end collision occurrence, the
tendency for drivers to get distracted or be inattentive when driving always poses the
possibility that drivers will fail to detect early enough that traffic ahead is stationary or
travelling slowly, leading, in turn, to late braking. However, the use of higher skid resistant
pavements can increase the likelihood that such late braking will still be sufficient to avoid a
rear end collision.
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Cairney (1997) reviewed the literature concerned with skid resistance and road crashes. The
most important finding of the review was that before and after comparisons of roads
resurfaced with skid resistant material typically found significant reductions in wet weather
crashes. Although results were mixed for dry weather crashes, the reductions in wet
weather crashes were sufficient in magnitude to make the surface treatments cost-
beneficial.
However, to achieve desirable cost-benefit ratios, it is best if skid resistant resurfacing is
targeted at appropriate road sites, rather than applied everywhere. Holbrook (1977)
compared the likely benefits of two different road treatment strategies in Michigan, USA
and found that it was better to resurface roads in a way likely to prevent the most wet
weather crashes (taking into account local levels of rain and crash history) than to keep skid
resistance at an acceptable level throughout the entire road network. The latter would be
less effective and would be expensive. Cairney (1997) advised that locations appropriate for
skid resistant pavement treatment were those that have a high ratio of wet to dry weather
crashes, and that have either high crash rates or a high total number of crashes (or both).
Choosing roads on the basis of crash history eliminates the need for time-consuming skid
resistance measurement procedures. Also, sites which are characterised by the need for
frequent braking (e.g. those with a steep grade) would be more likely to benefit from skid
resistant paving. Finally, if a road is characterised by rapidly increasing traffic growth or is
already unable to cope with the level of traffic it supports, then long term surface
treatments are not justified, as significant structural changes to the road will soon be
necessary (Cairney, 1997).
4.2 Vehicle-based countermeasures
Well-designed road environments that conform to the recommendations of the previous
section (4.1) would be expected to reduce the incidence of rear end collisions but such
crashes occur throughout the road network, not just at “blackspots”. Therefore,
countermeasures additional to road improvements are necessary. The countermeasures
applied to vehicles that could reduce rear end collision incidence are either directed at
increasing the conspicuity of braking vehicles, or alerting the driver of the following vehicle
that braking is necessary to avoid a collision with a vehicle in front.
4.2.1 Vehicle conspicuity
Altering the conspicuity of the rear of vehicles is thought to be a useful countermeasure
because low conspicuity has been hypothesised to play a role in rear end collisions. Sullivan
and Flannagan (2003) looked at changes in rear end collision occurrence in the weeks prior
to, and following, a change in ambient illumination caused by daylight saving changeovers in
the United States. Such analyses are used to compare the effects of changes in ambient
illumination while keeping clock time, and hence driving habits, constant. Using 15 years of
fatal crash data, they found that the risk of rear end collisions in hours of darkness was over
double that in hours of daylight. In particular, trucks were eight times more likely to be rear-
ended in hours of darkness. The authors concluded that their findings were indicative of an
increased rear end crash risk resulting from reduced conspicuity of vehicles at night (Sullivan
& Flannagan, 2003).
One means of increasing vehicle conspicuity is the application of retro-reflective material to
the rear of vehicles. Morgan (2001) conducted a study to determine the effectiveness of red
and white retroreflective tape for reducing side and rear impacts with heavy trailers (those
weighing over 10,000 pounds, or approximately 4,500 kilograms). The application of such
tape became compulsory in the United States for all new trailers manufactured after 1993. It
was thought that trailers are often not visible at night to other drivers until they are
dangerously close, and so adding retroreflective tape would indicate to following drivers that
a trailer was ahead. It was also hypothesised to aid drivers in judgement of distance and rate
of approach. Morgan collected data on over 10,000 crashes involving heavy trailers and
analysed crash involvement according to the presence of retroreflective tape, the level of
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ambient illumination, and crash type. It was found that retroreflective tape reduced the
occurrence of side and rear impacts with trailers by over 40 percent at night on roads
without artificial lighting. The tape was especially effective on flatbed trailers, which
presumably would be more difficult to see than other trailers without the enhanced
conspicuity provided by the tape. Also, larger reductions were found for injury crashes and
those in which the trailer was struck by drivers under the age of 50 (Morgan, 2001). The
requirements in Australia are not as stringent as those in the USA. Although Australian
Design Rule 13 requires heavy trailers (gross mass over 10 tonnes) to have retroreflective
marker plates on the rear, they are not required to extend the full width of the trailer. Also,
retroreflective marker plates are not required for smaller trailers.
Another change to the rear of vehicles that has been shown to be effective in reducing
crashes is the addition of Centre High Mounted Stop Lamps (CHMSLs). These additional
brake lights, usually mounted in the rear window, not only provide an additional light to warn
following drivers of braking but also, due to their position, are visible through a number of
following vehicles. The information that vehicles further ahead are braking effectively
provides drivers with advanced warning of the possibility that the vehicle directly in front of
them is likely to brake. Early reports of the effectiveness of CHMSLs (Kahane, 1987, 1989)
indicated reductions of around 20 percent in rear end collisions in which the front vehicle
was braking but later studies found more modest reductions. Farmer (1996) compared
vehicles of the model year 1985 with those of 1986 (the first full year in which CHMSLs
were required in the USA) for a period of six years (1986 to 1991) using insurance crash
data. After adjusting for differences in vehicle ages, a rear end crash reduction of 5 percent
was found for the vehicle models fitted with CHMSLs (Farmer, 1996). This analysis was not
able, however, to provide an indication of the extent to which CHMSLs, by providing
advance warnings of braking further down the traffic stream, reduced the likelihood that
vehicles following them were struck from behind. In Australia, CHMSLs have been fitted to
all new cars since 1989, in compliance with Australian Design Rule 60. Andreassen et al.
(1996, p53) recommended that retro-fitting of CHMSLs to vehicles manufactured prior to
1989 be “encouraged” and that CHMSLs be fitted to all new passenger vehicles, including
panel vans and utility vehicles. Given that vehicles manufactured prior to 1989 are now over
15 years old and are disappearing from the vehicle fleet, the possible gains from retrofitting
CHMSLs are considerably smaller than they would have been when Andreassen et al. made
this recommendation.
Another recent study was conducted to determine whether any benefits were likely from
another alteration to vehicle brake lights (Shinar, 2000). This study looked at the crash
involvement of a fleet of government vehicles, half of which were fitted with an advanced
brake warning system, which activated the brake lights whenever the accelerator was
released rapidly (a minimum of 0.3 metres per second). The theory behind the system is
that such rapid disengagement of the accelerator is typically followed by braking, and so
earlier activation of the brake lights would give drivers in following vehicles an average of
0.25 seconds of extra warning of the need to brake. In the study, the odds of “relevant”
rear end collisions were calculated for the two sets of cars (those with and those without
the advanced brake warning system). Relevant rear end collisions were those in which the
vehicle was struck from behind by an attentive driver after abrupt braking. Crashes in which
the vehicle was stationary prior to the impact were excluded. No significant difference was
found between the two sets of vehicles in the odds that they would be involved in a
relevant rear end collision. It was concluded by the authors that, if the warning system has
an effect, it is a small one, and so the system is not likely to be a cost-effective device for
reducing rear end crash occurrence (Shinar, 2000).
4.2.2 Collision avoidance systems
As noted by Mortimer (1993), drivers do not immediately brake upon seeing the activation of
brake lights on a vehicle in front of them. They use the brake signal on vehicles ahead only
as a signal of the possibility of needing to brake. Whether or not they do brake is decided on
the basis of their perceptions of the necessity of braking to avoid colliding with the vehicle in
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front. These decisions require consideration of the distance to the vehicle in front and the
rate of closure between the two vehicles. Studies of drivers’ perceptual processes have
found that judgements about the rate of closure between a driver’s own vehicle and the one
in front are based largely on the visual angle of the leading vehicle. As a result of this,
drivers do not perceive relative velocity cues until there is only a short time and distance to
the vehicle in front, which, in turn, is likely to contribute to the occurrence of rear end
collisions (McGehee, Dingus, & Horowitz, 1992; Mortimer, 1990).
Given this limited capacity of drivers to make accurate judgements on relative velocities
based on visual cues, a number of intelligent transport systems have been designed to aid
the drivers in avoiding rear end collisions. There are two main types of such systems. One is
‘adaptive cruise control’, which detects slower moving vehicles ahead and automatically,
through deceleration and braking, adjusts the speed of the ‘host’ vehicle to a comparable
level. The other type is a ‘collision warning system’, which detects slower vehicles ahead
and warns the driver of the host vehicle so that he or she can then take appropriate action
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2001). Most recent research has been focused on the
effectiveness of the combination of the two systems. That is, investigations have been
conducted into the crash avoidance properties of systems in which the vehicle reduces its
speed in response to slowing vehicles ahead by releasing the accelerator and lightly braking,
but, in situations requiring heavier braking to avoid a collision, warns the driver that further
action is necessary. Evaluations of prototypes of these devices have been conducted using
complex mathematical and computer modelling, driving simulator experiments, and field
trials in fleet vehicles being driven on public roads.
There are a number of issues in need of resolution with regard to the successful
implementation of adaptive cruise control and collision warning systems. One of the most
important is the timing of warnings given to the driver to brake in order to avoid a collision. If
warnings are given too early, there will be too many false alarms and drivers will begin to
disregard the system (Kodaka et al., 2003; Lee, McGehee, Brown, & Reyes, 2002). As
Horowitz and Dingus (1992) noted, the typical driver probably has a rear end collision once
every 25 years and so warnings should ideally be rare. However, if the system is set so that
warnings are given too late, then the system will be ineffective because it will not give
drivers sufficient time to avoid a collision (Kodaka et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2002).
One study that directly addressed the issue of the timing of warnings given to drivers was
that conducted by Lee et al. (2002). This study compared rear end collision avoidance on a
simulator according to drivers receiving an early or late warning, or no warning at all, and
according to whether the drivers were distracted or not by a secondary task. Different
speeds, headways, and lead vehicle deceleration rates were employed in order to
investigate the warning timing over a range of conditions. The system being tested used a
combination of auditory warning tones and the appearance of crash icons on the instrument
panel, and worked on the basis of an algorithm combining information on distance to the
vehicle in front, the assumed driver reaction time to a warning and deceleration capability of
the vehicle. The early warning condition involved the system acting as though the vehicle
was capable of 0.4G deceleration, while the late warning condition was based on a 0.75G
deceleration capability. The other two parameters were kept constant. It was found that
early warnings were associated with the least number of crashes on the simulator, followed
by late warnings and no warnings. This reduction in crashes was found to be due to faster
reaction to the lead vehicle braking (assessed by measuring release of the accelerator).
Drivers receiving no warning of the deceleration of the vehicle ahead were forced to brake
more heavily than drivers receiving the early warning. Therefore, an early warning protects
the driver from colliding with the vehicle in front but also means less need for heavy braking,
and so may reduce the likelihood of being struck from behind. The fact that the early
warning was associated with milder braking than for conditions in which the driver reacted
later demonstrates that drivers modulate their braking response according to the evolving
situation. The warning is therefore mainly a cue to release the accelerator and attend to the
vehicle in front, rather than immediately triggering a strong braking response. This pattern of
results was the same in the distraction and no distraction conditions. Furthermore, the
warnings conditions (early, late, none) had a greater effect on crash involvement rates than
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did levels of distraction. The authors acknowledged that the results of simulator studies
must be treated with caution because the threat of collisions is not a real one, and also that
the study did not evaluate the effects of false alarms on the success of the warning system.
However, they argued that since the system was found to influence driver’s attention rather
than to lead to immediate braking, the system would be unlikely to lead to unnecessary
braking and so the safety benefits would outweigh any negatives (Lee et al., 2002).
As mentioned above, in assessments of collision warning systems, it is important to
consider not just the likelihood of a collision with a vehicle in front but also any effects of the
system on following vehicles. Touran, Brackstone and McDonald (1999) conducted a
modelling study of an adaptive cruise control and rear end collision warning system, in
which they considered its effects on the likelihood of the equipped vehicle striking the one
in front and the likelihood of it being struck from behind, or of other rear end collisions
occurring further back in the traffic stream. The device assessed in this study maintained a
target headway of 1.4s and when braking capabilities of the device were insufficient to
avoid a collision, the driver was warned that intervention was necessary. Models were
developed of the braking profiles of four vehicles travelling on a highway, with the second
vehicle being equipped with the device and responding to heavy braking of the front vehicle.
The outputs of this model, in terms of crash involvement probabilities, were compared to
the outputs of the same models, except with no device fitted to the second vehicle. Various
parameters (e.g. level of braking by the front vehicle, driver perception reaction time) were
varied and 5,000 iterations were run. It was concluded that the probability of the second
vehicle striking the first was decreased by the addition of the device but that there was an
increased likelihood of the third vehicle striking the second, in cases of heavy braking of the
front vehicle, and an increased likelihood of the fourth vehicle striking the third at all levels of
braking. It was concluded that equipping a car with the device could “significantly reduce
the probability of the collision with the car ahead” but that it “may adversely affect the
situation for the following cars” (Touran et al., 1999, p567). The authors noted that the
actual outcomes of use of the device could be affected by changes in driver behaviour
(attentiveness, response time, driving speed) as a result of knowing the device was fitted,
by the ability of the device to function in adverse weather conditions, by the level of
occurrence of false alarms, by the ability of drivers to see several cars in front of the one
they are following, by drivers adopting much smaller headways than the 1.4s used in the
models, and by the likelihood that drivers will switch off the device (Touran et al., 1999).
As suggested by this list of factors that could affect the usefulness of collision avoidance
systems, the most convincing assessment of intelligent transport systems technology
comes from field tests of vehicles equipped with the technology. Only field tests can reveal
the real world interactions between drivers and the technology, and the likely benefits or
otherwise of fitting the technology to the vehicle fleet. Regan et al. (2004) reported on the
preliminary findings of a field study of a car fitted with a number of intelligent transport
systems, including a following distance warning device. This device gave the driver visual
warnings at headways below 2.0s, with the warnings increasing in intensity with decreasing
headway until an auditory warning is added at headways of less than 1.1s. In the study, a
fleet of government vehicles was used and the various devices were switched on and off
throughout the trial so that driving behaviour before, during and after exposure to the
devices could be examined. Preliminary results indicate that the following distance warning
device reduced the percentage of time people drove at small headways but this change in
behaviour disappeared after the device was switched off (Regan et al., 2004).
A field test of adaptive cruise control and a forward collision warning system was conducted
by Kiefer, Salinger and Ference (2005). Thirteen vehicles were fitted with these systems
and driven for four weeks. During the first week, the devices were not activated and
baseline driving behaviour data were collected. The adaptive cruise control could apply
brakes at a level of 0.3G and the desired headway (ranging from one to two seconds) was
chosen by the driver. The forward collision warnings consisted of visual icons of different
colour according to the urgency of the situation, starting at green, then amber, then red. The
final warning involved a flashing red icon and a beeping sound. It was found that both
devices reduced tailgating and neither appeared to have unintended negative safety
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consequences. Adaptive cruise control also resulted in fewer overtaking manoeuvres, and
any overtaking manoeuvres were made at greater headways. The maximum braking level
possible for the adaptive cruise control was rarely necessary, as drivers would usually
intervene themselves when adaptive cruise control began working. Forward collision
warnings were more common when the adaptive cruise control was not operating. One
problem found with the forward collision warning system was the common occurrence of
alerts in response to stationary roadside objects outside of the vehicle path. It was
concluded that the development of an acceptable forward collision warning system
represented a “formidable technical challenge” (Kiefer et al., 2005, p14).
Intelligent transport systems are a relatively new endeavour in road safety and
improvements to designs are ongoing. Collision warning systems suitable for rear end
collision avoidance are rapidly developing in complexity. Kodaka et al. (2003) reported on a
device that uses a radar sensor for forward vehicle detection that can function well in bad
weather, can detect vehicles ahead on curves and at distances of 100m. The vehicle is also
equipped with a wheel speed sensor, yaw rate sensor and steering angle sensor, so that
the system cam calculate the likelihood of a collision and whether a potential collision is
best avoided with a steering or braking response (Kodaka et al., 2003). The National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration and General Motors are collaborating on a system
that uses forward looking radar, a forward vision camera, a GPS receiver coupled with a map
database, and various in-vehicle sensors, so that it can detect and track targets and lane
boundaries, and predict upcoming road geometry. These assorted data are ‘fused’ to
determine if vehicles or objects ahead are in the path of the vehicle and whether a collision
is likely if no action is taken by the driver. It can track 15 targets simultaneously, and is
capable of recognising trucks in adjacent lanes on curves, and vehicles slowing to turn off a
highway, as not posing a collision threat (Ferenc, 2001; Koopmann & Najm, 2003).
Cohn (2002), meanwhile, conceived of a collision avoidance system that, instead of warning
the driver of the host vehicle that he or she is too close to the vehicle in front, warns the
drivers of following vehicles that they are approaching too quickly. This system, suitable for
large vehicles like trucks and buses, incorporates radar equipment to detect close following
or rapidly approaching vehicles and a series of amber lights that warn the following driver of
the high risk of collision. In a laboratory study, Cohn found that if an array of lights lit up
sequentially, the reaction time of following drivers would be shorter than if the lights lit up
all at once (Cohn, 2002). Field tests of Cohn’s light were conducted (Burns, 2005), with
assessments made of the degree to which the warning lights changed the braking
behaviour of drivers of cars behind buses. This was done by measuring the braking profiles
of samples of following vehicles, with and without activation of the light. Even without any
education of the public regarding the lights, the field test revealed that drivers exposed to
the warning lights had lower levels of braking intensity behind the bus. This was due to their
attention being drawn to the bus by the warning lights, and occurred regardless of which of
three different algorithms were used to determine the circumstances in which the lights
were triggered. Further development, particularly of the sensors used to monitor
approaching vehicles and trigger the warning lights, is needed before the system is able to
be commercialised (Burns, 2005).
Such innovations as those being developed by intelligent transport systems engineers need
to not only provide a demonstrable safety benefit but also have to appeal to consumers and
be user-friendly. In Japan, there has been little take-up of adaptive cruise control because
few drivers use expressways, and even conventional cruise control has been removed from
vehicles because of a lack of interest from drivers (National Transportation Safety Board,
2001). Mitsopoulos, Regan and Haworth (2002) conducted a focus group of drivers in
Victoria to determine the factors involved in likely consumer acceptance of intelligent
transport systems. With regard to forward collision warning devices, participants claimed
that cost and proven effectiveness would be the most important determinants of whether
they would be interested in buying cars equipped with the devices. Concerns were raised
about whether there would be repetitive nuisance warnings in dense traffic, whether people
may get overly reliant on the system, whether an audio warning could be heard over the
radio, and whether it would be difficult to discriminate between different warnings if a
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number of different systems were fitted to the car (Mitsopoulos et al., 2002). As noted
earlier, a field test was conducted by Kiefer et al. (2005) of a system incorporating adaptive
cruise control and forward collision warnings. Interviews with the drivers after the field test
found consumer appeal for the adaptive cruise control but not for the forward collision
warnings. This was attributed to the appeal of reduced workload and stress provided by
adaptive cruise control, and to the common occurrence of nuisance forward collision
warnings given for stationary roadside objects not in the vehicle path (Kiefer et al., 2005).
Finally, a report by the National Transportation Safety Board in the United States also notes
that it would be desirable if there was uniformity across the systems provided by different
vehicle manufacturers, particularly with respect to the human interface (National
Transportation Safety Board, 2001).
4.3 Summary and conclusions
Rear end collisions are a common crash type, and are typically associated with neck injuries
and costly compulsory third party claims. Causes of rear end collisions include certain design
characteristics of roads (particularly at intersections) and, most commonly, driver distraction
or inattention. Therefore, to reduce the incidence of rear end collisions, such road design
characteristics can be treated and methods to alert drivers to the risk of collision can be
implemented. Alerting drivers to the risk of collision, due to following too closely or rapidly
approaching a stationary or slow vehicle, can be accomplished with increased conspicuity of
the rear of vehicles, and with the introduction of intelligent transport systems such as
adaptive cruise control and advanced collision warning systems. Intelligent transport
systems are currently being developed, improved and evaluated in a number of ongoing
projects, the outcomes of which remain to be seen. Although these devices are capable of
providing early warning of potential collisions, it is necessary to examine the way drivers
interact with them in real-world settings before being certain that they can provide cost-
effective reductions in levels of crash involvement. Another means of reducing rear end
collisions, mainly in wet weather, is the improvement of pavement skid resistance. To be
cost-effective, such skid resistance treatments should be reserved for roads with a high rate
or number of such crashes, rather than implemented system wide.
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5 Overall summary and conclusions
Due to the common occurrence of rear end collisions in South Australia, and the costliness
of CTP claims associated with them, a study was undertaken into the nature of, and
possible countermeasures for, rear end collisions. This study included an analysis of five
years of police-reported crash data, an analysis of a sample of rear end crashes investigated
as part of the CASR metropolitan in-depth crash study, and a literature review concerned
with countermeasures for rear end crashes.
The results of the mass crash data analysis and the in-depth crash investigation were
consistent, with most rear end crashes occurring on straight, level roads and in clear
weather conditions. Both analyses also revealed that drivers of striking vehicles were more
likely to be young and male than drivers of the vehicles they struck. This is consistent with
notions that young, male drivers represent a problematic group of drivers who are often
crash-involved and also tend to be responsible for their crashes. Rear end crashes, in this
respect, are typical of crashes in general. Injuries resulting from rear end crashes also
tended to be of low severity, and the in-depth study revealed that occupants of struck
vehicles were more likely to require hospital treatment than occupants of striking vehicles.
Factors that increase the likelihood of the occurrence of rear end collisions include higher
traffic density (peak hour traffic, arterial roads), the presence of intersections, and the
presence of right turning vehicles. These factors are related to rear end crashes because
they increase the likelihood of conflict with slowing or stationary vehicles on the road.
There are a number of countermeasures to reduce rear end crashes involving stationary,
right turning vehicles. Where intersections feature a high frequency of collisions with right
turning vehicles, possible countermeasures include: relocation of the right turn to a different
intersection, provision of a right turn only lane, increasing the storage capacity of the right
turn lane so that turning vehicles are not forced to queue in adjacent through lanes, and
increasing the duration of right turn arrows. It may also be necessary to prevent situations in
which vehicles wait in a through lane just beyond the intersection in order to turn right into a
side road. The sample of rear end crashes investigated in the in-depth study included cases
in which vehicles were waiting to turn right from arterial roads without the benefit of
designated right turn only lanes, and also included a case in which the capacity of the right
turn lane was insufficient to cope with the number of vehicles waiting to turn right, resulting
in a vehicle protruding into the through lane and being struck in the rear. There were also a
number of crashes in which vehicles were struck when waiting to turn right from single lane
roads that did not allow through traffic to pass on the left. For the latter crashes, available
engineering solutions are likely to be prohibitively expensive, unless traffic volumes satisfy
the requirements for a major upgrade of the road, as was the case for the road in one of the
crashes investigated. Such crashes may need to be addressed using countermeasures for
inadequate allocation of attention (see below).
Countermeasures are also available for left turning traffic at intersections. Slip lanes that
make turning simpler can be introduced, enabling left turning traffic to turn into the adjoining
road prior to merging with traffic, or a larger angle between the left turn lane and adjoining
road can be used, enabling better visibility of traffic to aid the determination of gap
acceptance. There was one crash in the in-depth study involving a left turning vehicle being
struck from behind. The striking driver moved in response to a gap in the traffic on the
adjoining road in anticipation of the struck vehicle turning. If the left turn had been simpler,
the struck vehicle may have been able to turn at this point rather than remaining stationary,
although inadequate allocation of attention on the part of the striking driver was still the
prime determining factor of the crash.
Another factor that can increase the likelihood of rear end collisions is parked vehicles by the
side of the road. Clearways and parking restrictions on the approach to intersections are
useful because they enhance the visibility of the intersection and other traffic, and reduce
obstacles in the vicinity of the intersection that could cause vehicles to stop. The in-depth
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study included three cases where legally parked vehicles may have contributed to the
occurrence of a rear end collision. It is also important to note that both the TARS analysis
and the in-depth study analysis excluded cases where the struck vehicle was parked. In the
in-depth study, seven of the original sample of 47 cases classified as rear end crashes
involved collisions into the rear of parked vehicles.
Relatively few rear end collisions in the in-depth study were the result of the restriction of
driver vision caused by curved roads. This is consistent with the small percentage of such
crashes that occur on curved roads, due to the paucity of curved roads in metropolitan
Adelaide. Nonetheless, the literature suggests that where intersections are present shortly
after a curve in the road, it would be useful for drivers to be warned by appropriate signs of
the possibility of queued stationary traffic following the curve.
Also, relatively few rear end crashes in the in-depth study were associated with wet
weather, as was the case with the police-reported crashes included in the TARS analysis.
This would suggest that relatively few of the crashes would have been avoided, or their
severity reduced, by skid resistance treatment of the road surface. Skid resistance
treatments, however, may still prove cost-beneficial in South Australia if applied to roads
with high crash rates, especially if such roads have a high ratio of wet to dry weather
crashes or are characterised by a marked down slope.
Turning to driver-related factors, inadequate allocation of attention was a frequent
contributor to crash causation, and may have been underestimated in the results, given that
interviews in which attentional issues were explored were not possible with all crash
participants. Inadequate allocation of attention could be divided into four different types:
cases in which drivers were not sufficiently focused on the driving task, cases in which
drivers were distracted from the driving task by objects or events either in or outside the
vehicle, cases in which the drivers were unable to adequately divide their attention between
two or more driving-related tasks, and cases in which drivers were unable to adequately
allocate their attention to appropriate aspects of the road and traffic environment when
changing lanes.
In order to combat the inadequate allocation of attention of drivers, the necessary
countermeasure would be the installation in vehicles of collision avoidance systems. Such
systems typically combine adaptive cruise control, which slows the vehicle automatically in
response to the presence of slower vehicles ahead, and devices that actively alert the driver
to the need to apply heavier braking to avoid a collision. Early studies of prototype collision
avoidance systems have revealed that they are capable of providing useful early warnings to
drivers of the need to take evasive action to avoid collisions. However, it is necessary to
examine the way drivers interact with them in real-world settings before being certain that
they can provide cost-effective reductions in levels of crash involvement. Specifically, it
needs to be assessed whether drivers begin to disregard the collision warnings after a
series of ‘nuisance’ alarms.
The literature also reports on the advantages of increasing the conspicuity of the rear of
vehicles to decrease the likelihood of rear end collisions. Few crashes in the in-depth study
were attended at night, and none of those occurring during the day was clearly related to
low conspicuity of the rear of the struck vehicle. Although this may mean that low
conspicuity is not a common factor in rear end crashes, there are likely to be some such
crashes in which it is. The use of specially designed lights on the rear of vehicles to warn
following drivers that they are too close or closing too quickly may prove useful, by both
increasing conspicuity and combating the inattention of following drivers, although work on
these projects is in the early stages only.
Finally, a number of the rear end collisions investigated in the in-depth study were
associated with medical conditions and/or drug use on the part of the driver of the striking
vehicle. Although these crashes also involved inadequate allocation of attention to the
driving task, it is unclear whether collision avoidance systems would have been sufficient to
prevent their occurrence. These cases highlight the importance of the application of medical
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fitness to drive guidelines (Austroads, 2001) to prevent people driving when their mental or
physical state is incompatible with the safe operation of a motor vehicle.
In summary, this report has provided a detailed account of the nature of rear end collisions,
using both mass police-reported crash data and the information collected in in-depth
metropolitan crash investigations. The most common factors contributing to these types of
crashes are the lack of protection for right turning vehicles and the inadequate allocation of
attention by drivers to the driving task. Countermeasures are available for both of these
contributing factors. Also, although not directly addressed in this report, it needs to be borne
in mind that countermeasures that reduce traffic congestion would provide major reductions
in rear end collisions.
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